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Introduction
Roughly one million out of eleven million Uyghurs living in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (Xinjiang) in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are currently detained
in Chinese internment camps.1 Though sinologists and the Western media often equate these
detainment centers with concentration camps emblematic of Nazi Germany’s ‘final solution,’
Chinese officials insist they are centers where majority-Muslim Uyghurs are reeducated to help
them find stable employment.2 Despite the Chinese government’s characterization of these places
as Vocational Education and Training Centers, leaked documents and first hand accounts detail
the repressive policies targeting the minority Uyghur population. Reportedly, these internment
camps permit torture, food deprivation, forced labor, and sterilization.3 The Chinese government
insists that its actions “[ensure] social stability in Xinjiang, … [conform] to the basic principles
of international efforts in countering terrorism and extremism, and [accord] with the fundamental
interests and needs of the peoples all around the world”.4 The Uyghurs do not accept this statist
narrative and argue adamantly that they are targeted for their cultural and religious practices.
Although other governments have faced accusations of human rights violations for similar uses
of torture and forced labor, the Chinese state’s role as a permanent member on the UN Security
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Busby, Scott. “Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary Scott Busby Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity.”
2
Asat, Rayhan and Yonah Diamon. “The World’s most Technologically Sophisticated Genocide is Happening in
Xinjiang.”; Brabant, Malcolm. “This Dissident Leaked Explosive Documents Depicting China’s Brutal Treatment of
Uighurs.”; The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China. “Vocational Education and
Training in Xinjiang.” Foreign Policy and PBS make note of the similarties between the Chinese Concentration
Camps and Holocaust Concentration Camps in Nazi, Germany. Despite these accusations, The State Council
Information Office of the People's Republic of China published a white paper on Vocational Education and Training
in Xinjiang, insisting their methods eradicate preexposed conditions that give way to terrorism annd religious
extremism.
3
Cuccinelli, Ken and Mark Morgan. “Countering China's Forced Labor Practices.”; Wang, Maya. “More Evidence
of China’s Horrific Abuses in Xinjiang.”
4
The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China. “Vocational Education and Training in
Xinjiang.”
3

Council places them in a position to weaken human rights worldwide and avoid penalties for
their potential violations.5
This thesis investigates these escalating tensions, within the larger context of Xinjiang’s
contested historical narratives and the numerous voices that have emerged from the region in the
recent decades. An understanding and examination of “the various ways fictions of the modern
nation’s deep historical roots [have] been constructed”6 will reveal the present flashpoints of
contention regarding the Uyghur-Chinese conflict. Until recently, the dominant account
accessible to an international audience has been that of the Chinese state rather than the
Uyghurs’. Domestic and international voices in support of the Uyghurs became more audible
toward the end of 2019 when social media activists and a variety of other news outlets started to
report on the plentiful, yet often unrecognized, human rights violations. Mapping the multiplicity
of Uyghur chronicles that have emerged in conversation with the Chinese state will shed light on
the multidimensional layers of factors—domestic and global—that have informed contemporary
Chinese state policies toward the Muslim Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Of particular concern will be the
specific factors that have led the Chinese state to label this group as terrorists. This thesis
question is approached from a temporal and spatial frame of reference in order to carefully
consider the intersection between those factors. The following question will illuminate, and bring
to the forefront, the conflicting narratives: What are the historical roots of the Chinese
government’s view of the Muslim Uyghurs as terrorists? The goal of this thesis is to use
historical evidence to develop an understanding of the two viewpoints in contention to unravel
the complexities of a crucial, modern-day issue.

5
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Chapter I, “Slow Boil in the New Frontier: Qing History and Historiography of
Xinjiang”, maps the New Qing scholarship of the region from the 17th to 19th century. This
material is invaluable for understanding the colonial nature of the Qing empire and its impact in
Xinjiang.7 The chapter will argue that the Qing colonization of the region is best understood as a
watershed moment in Xinjiang’s history when considered within the context of the centuries that
preceded the establishment of Qing rulership. A watershed moment is thought of as a prominent
event or sequence of events that mark a historically relevant or notable change. Elucidating the
Qing conquest and the imperial practices that characterized its particular form of colonialism will
provide an understanding of the significance of the Qing’s colonial legacy for modern Chinese
state policies.
Chapter II, “From Empire to Modern State (1949-2021): Reception and Transformation
of the Qing Colonial Legacy” focuses on the Chinese government’s development of the colonial
legacy bequeathed by the Qing dynasty. Building on the first chapter’s discussion of the
historiography and history of Qing colonialism, Chapter II elaborates on how the present-day
Chinese government continued, yet also transformed, the Qing legacy. The chapter examines
domestic and global factors in assessing the Chinese state’s justification of its policies from the
formation of the PRC in 1949. Of noteworthy interest will be how global factors, including the
War on Terror, have shaped these policies.
In contrast to the statist perspectives of the first two chapters, Chapter III, “Domestic and
International Responses to the Chinese State”, calls attention to the local and international voices
contesting the civilizing and colonizing projects of the modern Chinese state. Despite the
limitations placed upon the local Uyghur population in Xinjiang, their voices have not been
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The Qing empire was the last imperial dynasty of the PRC and remained in control from 1844 until 1912. Those in
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completely silenced yet. Chapter III will identify and analyze the variety of contemporary voices
within the Uyghur community, including intellectuals, who place themselves in a vulnerable
position when advocating openly for human rights within the PRC. On the other hand,
international voices within the United States have found success given the wide range of
frameworks, whether historically or politically based, to redress this population’s struggles given
that the local community no longer has the autonomy to do so.
A concluding chapter summarizes and evaluates the historical roots, whether domestic or
international, that impact the Chinese government’s view of the Uyghurs in a modern context.
Looking back from the Qing period until the present day provides a sense of what occurred over
the course of the previous three centuries and allows for a potential guide to emerge for thinking
about Xinjiang and the different possibilities to resolve the tensions embedded within the
Uyghur-Chinese state conflict.

6

Chapter I: Slow Boil in the New Frontier
Introduction
The PRC is the fourth largest country in the world by land mass yet also the most
populous with 1.3 billion people. The autonomous province of Xinjiang is the largest of five
within the PRC and has extensive societal, cultural, ethnic, and historical roots sprawling across
its mountains, basins, and oases. The region was officially established by the Chinese state as an
autonomous region, rather than a province, in 1955.8 Despite its late incorporation, the history of
Xinjiang, literally meaning ‘New Territory’ or ‘New Domain,’ extends back centuries. Its story
begins with the conquest and subsequent colonization of the region under the Qing dynasty
(1644-1911).9 Examining the history and the historiography of the Qing conquest and
colonization of Xinjiang allows one to understand why these historical events are best
understood as a watershed moment in the centuries-long history of Xinjiang as a crossroads
region with multiple and ephemeral forms of rulership. The Qing’s colonial acquisition of vast
amounts of land, consolidation of power through varying imperial administrative institutions,
and mass migration policies allowed the empire to solidify itself as a permanent form of
rulership, something Xinjiang had never before encountered.
Pre-Qing
Before the Qing came to power, Xinjiang was governed by a series of partial rulers
through various fragmented alliances. Consequently, the region’s political authority was
consistently in a state of contestation with a plurality of entities fighting over administrative and
agricultural control. From the 2nd century BC until the Qing conquered and assumed control in
8

Municipalities, provinces, autonomous regions, and special administrative regions all belong to the provincial-level
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the late 1750s, there was little stable authority over Xinjiang. Throughout the Classical Period
(first half of the 2nd century BCE), a Tug-of-War relationship between the Han and Xiongnu
forces over the Tarim Basin, the southern half of the province, lasted for over two centuries.10
This trend continued into the Middle Period (221 CE to the 6th century) with additional ethnic
and political entities grappling for control.11 The Turks, Tibetans, Arabs, and Chinese of the Tang
dynasty became involved in this fluid and complex situation.12 By the end of the Middle Period,
all of the powers in contention for the region came from outside of Xinjiang’s borders. The
Mongol Period (13th to 17th century) leading up to the Qing conquest was no different. This vast
empire was not one political unit, but four distinct khanates. These khanates were analogous to a
kingdom or empire, but delineated as being ruled by the Khan. In this context, a Khan was
classified as a ruler or monarch of the Mongol tribes. Due to their close proximity and lengthy
history, the four khanates continuously engaged in struggle and often competed with one another
for regional domination.13 From the 2nd century BC until the Manchus of the Qing dynasty
established itself as the sole political power in the 1750s, there was not a single governmental or
administrative unit able to solidify profound and long lasting control over the region. This
transient state of Xinjiang rulership ceased to exist when the Qing forcefully entered the Chinese
borderland with intent to imperialize.
The New Qing Scholarship and The Colonial Nature of the Qing Conquest
Considering Europe has been the dominant epicenter for producing history from their
biased perspective over previous centuries, imperialism is often solely associated with Western
10
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nations: Britain’s rule over India, Spain in Portugal, and France in Nova Scotia.14 One example
of a Eurocentric text is European Imperialism: 1830 to 1930 written by Alice Conklin and Ian
Fletcher, this book articulates how modern European imperialism, including Britain’s imperial
control of India, not only transformed global political, economic, social, and cultural
relationships, but laid the foundation for the modern world. All of this was accomplished without
recognizing or mentioning the impact of East Asian empires. There is a sense of incompleteness
due to the omission of Asian experiences with imperialism, giving into the dominant Eurocentric
frame of mind that consumes this field.
Due to these omissions, in recent decades, a number of Qing scholars attempted to
reverse this Eurocentric trend by incorporating Qing history into the broader discourse. This
scholarship disrupted the conventional norms surrounding the Eurocentric view of imperialism.
Qing scholars call attention to the ways Qing conquests shared characteristics with its European
brethren while also departing from them. For example, the East Asian continental empire did not
venture far overseas, but rather integrated adjacent borderlands into their nexus, exemplified by
their conquest of Xinjiang.15 The Qing needs to be consistently identified as an empire and
discussed in the context of great European empires in order to make sense of the dynasty’s
impact on Xinjiang during its era of rule and to the present day.
Chinese history is filled with imperial conquests. A full century after the Qing dynasty
was established in 1636, the Qianlong emperor conquered and imperialized Xinjiang in the
1750s. Imperialism is the process by which an expanding state dominates the territory,
population, and resources of less powerful states, regions, political entities, or land previously

14
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claimed.16 The term imperialism captures a wide range of disparate actions and policies which
can be classified anywhere between informal and formal. As the new Qing scholars have argued,
the Qing empire successfully mastered all forms of imperialism on this spectrum and therefore
should be considered as a notable empire.17 Informal imperialism consists of less overt forms in
which indirect economic influence occurs despite the consistent looming threat of military force.
Prasenjit Duara points out how indirect or informal imperialism took hold in the PRC, the
Ottoman Empire, and Iran, where imperialists dominated not by direct control of state
apparatuses, but rather by economic control.18 The Qing’s method of economic control in
Xinjiang was cutting off certain trade routes and establishing others. Xinjiang’s geographical
position on the Silk Road was imperative for commercial success, as it is the case in modern
times as well.19 The Qing wanted to reposition trade toward the center of the empire as a way to
establish greater economic control and mutual reliance.20
In contradistinction, colonialism is designated as formal imperialism as it is considered to
be a subset of imperialism. Some scholars, including Peter Perdue, note that “the two terms
generally describe related aspects of the same phenomena”.21 However, there is an important
distinction to be made to show the gravity and specificity of Qing colonialism in Xinjiang. The
Qing’s colonizing ambitions in Xinjiang can not consistently be equated with the Qing’s
imperialism elsewhere.22 Colonialism, as a specific subset of imperialism, is classified as state
16

Cosmo, Nicola Di. “Qing Colonial Administration in Inner Asia.”; Hobson, J. A. Imperialism: A Study.; Larsen,
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intervention in which military and/or administrative control is put into place for the purpose of
establishing direct authority.23
Nicola Di Cosmo argues that the Qing empire can be classified as a colonialist power due
to its conquest and rule of Inner Asia. Colonialism is evident in Xinjiang by the Qing’s forceful
settlement of new inhabitants in the 18th century despite the established indigenous populations
in the region.24 Furthermore, from 1736 to 1820, the Qing maintained military settlements
(Bingtuan) in Xinjiang.25 The military control, rather than their presence, is what classifies this
military involvement as colonialism rather than informal imperialism.26 Correspondingly, the
Qing established administrative entities in Beijing and Xinjiang. The administrative structure
consisted of native elites who were to monitor the Qing’s systems, raise taxes, control foreign
relations, reorient Xinjiang toward China proper, and control the migration of people across the
frontier.27 Perdue argues the Qing’s frontier settlement of immigrants was another distinctive
feature of colonial practice.28 Di Cosmo and Perdue’s argument exemplifies specific elements of
Qing rule that established the empire’s colonial nature in the peripheral region of Xinjiang and
why it needs to be placed in the same context as their European counterparts.
Having discussed the multitude of ways the Qing empire must be considered as a colonial
power, it is now essential to place the dynasty in the same domain as other European empires.
East Asian and Chinese scholars attempt to rectify the Eurocentric failure, as demonstrated in
Conklin and Fletcher’s work, and advocate for the inclusion of the Qing with other empires
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through their scholarly works. Perdue focuses on the interaction between empires and argues that
although there are differences between the Chinese and European empires, the Qing empire
should be closely considered in the context of the other great colonial empires despite being
located in the East. He further argues that the Great Qing held similar goals as European
expansionists and that its shared ideologies over security and economic concerns for its nations
were handled in a similar manner. Kirk Larsen agrees, stating that the rise of the Qing and its
expansion “can and should be fruitfully compared with a wide range of imperialist powers across
the globe”.29 The Qing distinguished itself as an empire when it built formal state structures
through administrative institutions in Xinjiang. Along with these came military entities used for
repression or defense.30 These colonizing strategies carried out as part of the Qing dynasty’s
grand expansion worked well during its peak of domination. The recognition of institutions
illustrates how the field has developed and become less Eurocentric with the development of the
new Qing scholarship.
The Watershed Moment
The Qing was not the first imperial power in Xinjiang. As previously mentioned, outside
influence penetrated the region for centuries before. An indication of Xinjiang’s turbulent past is
the many populations that claimed the land. However, the Qing initiated an unprecedented form
of imperial control that ultimately became a historical watershed moment. Outlining the
dynasty’s imperial patterns and behaviors illustrates how it established hegemonic superiority
over Xinjiang and its people and laid the historical foundation for the contemporary persecution
of the Uyghurs. The Qing conquest of the vast Xinjiang region is a watershed moment due to the
execution of its imperialist strategy to promote the empire’s local and international needs of the

29
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Larsen, Kirk W. “The Qing Empire (China), Imperialism, and the Modern World.”
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time, consolidate power through imperial administrative and military institutions, execute forced
migration, and other the Xinjiang peoples.
Expansionist Desires
As the Qing rulers became a preeminent power over the decades, they ascertained that in
order to continue their prosperity, imperializing Xinjiang would satisfy domestic and
international concerns.31 The Qing sought to expand its uncontested power and rule throughout
Asia. The Ming Dynasty, the last Han Chinese empire before the Qing, at its peak in 1450, had
2.5 million square miles.32 The Qing substantially expanded upon those territories by more than
twofold. At its peak in 1790, the Qing built up an empire of 5.7 million square miles.33 The
Qianlong Emperor, the emperor at the time of the Xinjiang conquest, personally wrote and
admitted “this territorial expansion was far in excess [of Kangxi’s]”34 as was “the incorporation
of distant lands far more complete”.35 The addition of Xinjiang to the empire was not a trifling
matter, the region’s land mass is about 642,000 square miles.36
Not only did the Qing desire the vast lands of Xinjiang to expand their empire, Qing
rulers also expressed strategic interest in conquering Xinjiang for its geographical location. The
Qing understood its geostrategic importance and wanted to establish a strong foothold there,
regardless of whether or not it was economically profitable. James Millward argues that Qing
rulers did not view Xinjiang as a place for economic profit or wealth growth, but rather as a
31
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32
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strategic imperial conquest.37 This conquest was motivated by a desire to create a secure buffer
zone and seal off Xinjiang from central Asia. 38 The strategic purpose for taking this region was to
use it as a buffer between the Qing and Russian empire, who was one of the Qing’s neighboring
rivals at the time. The Russian empire was seen as the prime threat to Qing domination for its
increasing authority and close proximity. Often, colonizers will justify their aims in order to
convey their method of reasoning. While the threat was authentic, the Qing unduly framed its
conquest as a buffer for security reasons and claimed that the Han and Tang era borders would be
reinstated.39 If these borders were to actually be reinstated, the perimeter of the Qing dynasty
would have extended farther north past Xinjiang’s border and cut off Russian access to the region
economically and geographically.
This ideological reasoning, combined with the colonizing mentality, led the Qing empire
to conquer the region of Xinjiang despite it belonging to the Dzungars, various Oirat tribes who
predominantly lived in the northern region.40 The dynasty brutally eliminated the Dzungar people
in the mid-18th century when Qianlong sent an army of 50,000 and crushed them in merely 100
days, forcefully taking over the region.41 Not only did the Qing desire the vast lands of Xinjiang
to expand the geographical perimeters of the empire, this conquest was done over international
concerns of foreign entities and enemies impeding the Qing’s colonial ambitions.
Imperial Institutions
Xinjiang was not new to these imperial conquests. For centuries, foreign entities invaded
the region’s borders. However, the novel way the Qing controlled and consolidated its rule and
created a systematic administration that it would maintain for a century was previously
37
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39
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38
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unmatched. By establishing imperial military and civil administrative institutions, the Qing
solidified its rule as the dominant power in the region. Thus, not only the persistence of Qing
control, but the depth and breadth of military and administrative control, suggests that Qing
colonialism constitutes a watershed moment in the history of the region.
In an attempt to secure and maintain control of their newly expanded territory, the Qing
implemented military colonies (Tuntian) across Xinjiang. Throughout the Qing period, there
were 22,200 soldiers of the Green Standard Army and 14,800 soldiers of the Eight Banners.42
The Green Standard Army contained a Han majority while the Eight Banners were Manchu
forces stationed to protect the homeland.43 The
number of military colonies greatly surpassed
the military presence established by earlier
conquerors whose hold on the region was more
ephemeral and tenuous. Millward argues that
Xinjiang’s military colonies early on were
established for security reasons rather than
economic profit.44 As depicted in the image, the colonies were concentrated in the northern area
of Xinjiang.45 During this era, Western imperialist powers were beginning to exhibit more
aggressive behavior along the eastern seaboard of the Qing empire. The military colonies were
established as a preventative buffer to prevent encroachment of other foreign powers on the north
and west boundaries. This is why military colonies were prevalent in the north, along the edges
42
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of the Russian empire, and subsided the further south you went. The empire was concerned about
what historians now call ‘the Great Game’, the competition among Western and Russian
imperialist powers to gain better access and exploit the regions of the Qing empire.46 While the
Qing was always concerned about the international factors impacting its empire, such as foreign
enemies, the dynasty had domestic concerns as well that the military could attempt to mitigate.
New civilian settlements were complemented by military ones in order to keep local tensions at
ease.47 Di Cosmo argues that the implementation of these military colonies sheds light on
features of Qing colonialism that are comparable to the new imperialism seen elsewhere across
the globe.48
Despite the relatively consistent presence of Qing-sanctioned settlements in Xinjiang,
they were informed by two distinct administrative ideologies. Jane Burbank and Frederick
Cooper coin the term ‘repertoires of power’ to differentiate between various types of imperialist
conquest. The authors argue there are many variations of imperial authority across diverse
regions and that there are “strikingly different ways in which imperial expansion across
land—not just seas—produced different configurations of politics and society”.49 Namely, there
was little interest in assimilation or sinicization in regards to the Qing conquest of the northern
province in the beginning but, in regards to the Tarim Basin, this region was “characterized by a
[strong] central government presence; more openness to immigrants from China; more active
expropriation of land and mineral resources; and measures aimed at assimilating the natives”.50
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The first form of Qing rule, before becoming more autocratic, was pluralistic and flexibly
accommodated the region’s interests.51 The Qing used native elites to help implement Chinese
administrative systems in Xinjiang.52 The Manchu rulers of Xinjiang worked with, and relied on,
the local elites (begs) to run and maintain the development of the region. At the time, this was
one way to maintain and control a multi-ethnic political entity. Examined from a modern day
perspective, this form was met with greater reception overall. It was successful because the Qing
rulership did not entail the forced alteration of local society. However, these lenient policies did
not last. As Xinjiang became more important to the dynasty, the Qing rulers, with their imperial
mindset, sought to establish their control of Xinjiang more deeply and firmly as part of their
empire.
Their administrative institutions reflect this shift in ideology. Chinese-style
administration, run by Qing government officials, replaced the local Turkic elites with Manchu
officials.53 Instead of a flexible policy in which local customs of rule remained intact,
bureaucratic organizations that were imperialist and colonialist in nature were instituted. What
was once an integrationist approach now became outwardly assimilationist. In 1884, the Qing
unified the Buddhist Mongol area north of the Tianshan (Zungharia) and Turkic Muslim area
south of the Tianshan (Tarim Basin) into what we now know as Xinjiang.54 After 1884, this
administrative period was characterized by central control, provincialization, settlement into the
region, militarization, and greater economic connection to the center. The depth and breadth of
Qing administrative presence differed from what came before. This form of governance was
similar to the new imperialism spreading across the globe in which agricultural and military
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settlements were paired with state supervision. Millward argues that the new Qing control
inaugurated a more permanent rulership that set the stage for future colonialist projects in the
region.55 The local population were now always thought of as colonial subjects. This
characterization led to resistance against the Qing state when a Chinese style of administration
was implemented and became increasingly assimilationist. The Qing overlords justified the
bureaucratic rule by ensuring economic self-sufficiency and stability for the region of Xinjiang.56
The lasting legacy of the Qing and this significant turning point stems from their ability to
consolidate power in Xinjiang, which sets the stage for the Chinese government today.
The consolidation of power extended to economic relations with foreign entities as well.
While Xinjiang was close to the Russian empire and central Asia, there was only a modest trade
dynamic between them.57 Despite the limited flow of goods, the Qing cut off trade routes with
these regions in order for Xinjiang’s economy to be rerouted toward Beijing rather than other
peripheral empires or regions.58 The ultimate rationale behind the Qing’s motives was to recenter
Xinjiang’s economy toward the core of the Qing dynasty. This economic concern was an attempt
to keep the empire as unified as possible economically and structurally for profit. Ultimately, the
Qing faced similar challenges with the Russian empire in regards to foreign incursion. Russia
became greedy and pursued as many privileges as other European powers had attained within the
Qing territory.59 Despite the attempt to block access, as was the case originally with Western
powers on the coast, the Russian empire ultimately prevailed with the Treaty of Ghulja. This
treaty transformed the relations between Russia and the Qing, what were once fairly equal
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relations now turned highly unequal, as Russian consuls and factories were given the right to
increase their commerce in the geographical sphere of Xinjiang.60
Although the Qing’s attempts to redirect trade did not attain the level of success the
dynasty was striving to achieve, its imperial administrative and military institutions penetrated
deeply into Xinjiang’s society with profound effects. This represented an unparalleled level of
societal alteration in the history of the region. The Qing used this system to govern vast, imperial
borderland regions, contributing significantly to a watershed moment in Xinjiang’s history.
Forced Migration
After the near elimination of the Dzungar population, Xinjiang’s northern region was
drastically depopulated. Despite Qing records claiming that the dynasty’s armies took the lives of
more than 1 million Dzungars, scholars estimate this number to be closer to between 480,000
and 800,000, which is still 80% of the Dzungar population.61 The Qing acted swiftly to reverse
the population loss by settling Han Chinese in Xinjiang. This strategy became a top priority and
is one of the reasons the Qing dynasty can be classified as a watershed moment: Imperial policy
encouraged the migration of Han Chinese into the region, establishing a precedent for settler
colonialism in Xinjiang.
Settler colonialism is a distinctive subset of
colonialism. Empires will attempt to replace or
repopulate a region with invasive techniques through the
introduction of new settler colonies of their specific
choosing. Peter Charles argues that the specific
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differentiation between colonialism and settler colonialism is that settler colonialism intends to
permanently occupy and assert sovereignty over indigenous lands rather than for a limited period
of time.62 Ultimately, this technique is implemented to expand territory.63 As the catalyst for this
practice, the Qing’s resettlement actions became standard fare for decades to come.64
Throughout the latter half of the 18th century, the Qing repopulated the northern region
of Xinjiang with Kazakhs, Han and Hui from Gansu, Uyghur-Turks from the South, and Xibo
from Manchuria.65 While the data is not
exact, scholars estimate by the early
1800s the Qing shifted the demographics
of the region so greatly that the Chinese
(Han, Hui), Qing officials, and
commoners constituted 38% of the
Xinjiang population.66 These Chinese
settlers were only permitted to settle north of the Tianshan mountains in order to keep the
Chinese separate from the indigenous Uyghur population in the south, a precursor for the modern
day ethnic tensions.67 Gong Zizhen and Wei Yuan, powerful Chinese officials, supported
resettling Chinese in the region to assure a steady supply of labor to staff the imperial military
and administrative institutions.68

62

Charles, Peter. “The ‘New Borderlands’ and Settler Colonialism in Xinjiang.”
Tuck, Eve and Julie Gorlewski. “Racist Ordering, Settler Colonialism, and edTPA: A Participatory Policy
Analysis”, Page 210.
64
Image: Lauren Munster.
65
Toops, Stanley. “The Population Landscape of Xinjiang/East Turkestan”, Page 158.
66
Stanley Toops. “The Demography of Xinjiang.” In Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland, edited by Starr, S. F.
67
Image: Lu, Xinyu, Ming Wei, Guoqiang Tang, and Yingxin Zhang. “Evaluation and Correction of the TRMM
3B43V7 and GPM 3IMERGM Satellite Precipitation Products by use of Ground-Based Data Over Xinjiang,
China.”; This issue will be fleshed out further in future sections.
68
Millward, James A. Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759-1864.
63

20

The Qing initiated another important policy meant to guarantee a steady supply of
unskilled and skilled labor to the region. Dynasty officials designed a system of banishment
intended to combine severe punishment with both the colonization of the frontier and the
rehabilitation of offenders.69 In total, 9,200 criminals were exiled to the region during Qing
control.70 One of the more notable political exiles was Lin Zexu, a scholar-official under the
Qianlong Emperor. He was banished to the region, in addition to thousands of others, for his
outspokenness on the negative impacts of Chinese trade with British opium suppliers since there
was “strong proof that [the British] [knew] full well how hurtful [opium] [was] to mankind”.71
Zexu’s letter to Queen Victoria precipitated the demise of the Qing empire when British military
penetrated the Chinese coast.72 This invasion showcases how the Qing held both the positions of
colonizer and victim. The ultimate downfall of the Qing empire in the late 19th and early 20th
century was due to increasing Western encroachment from the Eastern seaboard. Before this
could fully occur, the Qing dynasty successfully altered the ethnic ratio of the Xinjiang region in
accordance with their strategic aims.
An Instilled Hierarchy
Despite the attempts at sinicization, the Qing could never fully cement their imperial aims
in Xinjiang due to fostering a sense of otherness and instilling a societal hierarchy. There were
other reasons for their failure to solidify stable imperial control over the region as well, including
difficulty with Qing troops supporting themselves and the lack of desire from emperors to pay
for more military presence to quell the rising local tensions.73 These challenges meant the
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dynasty’s hold on the region remained tenuous until it formally incorporated Xinjiang into the
empire as a province in 1884. With tensions rising, many Qing scholars saw Xinjiang and its
people as uncivilized who were negligible to Qing politics moving forward. The Confucian
ideologies of the empire contrasted markedly with those of the Islamic regions in Xinjiang.
Chinese intellectuals and scholars thought “Xinjiang’s people did not deserve Qing rule and the
territory did not deserve defense… Some even considered Xinjiang to be a ― useless land”,74
including Wu-long-a, a famous Manchu official. Those same individuals instilled a sense of the
other and justified this ideology with the use of civilizing projects, both of which contribute to
the Qing’s hierarchical relationship embedded within this watershed moment.
One form of justification for the othering of Xinjiang is through civilizing projects.
Civilizing projects establish a perception of “superiority and inferiority that [maintain] the
hierarchy by justifying it through ideology and institutions, making it seem both proper and
neutral to both the rulers and the ruled”.75 A hegemonic relationship is created between the center
and periphery in which the dominant center has an impulse to interact with and educate the other
due to the unquestioned hierarchy that is inherently unequal. The inequality occurring “between
the civilizing center and the peripheral peoples has its ideological basis in the center’s claim to a
superior degree of civilization, along with a commitment to raise the peripheral peoples’
civilization to the level of the center”.76 This behavior exemplified by the Qing directly parallels
an Orientalist attitude.
Edward Said, a professor at Columbia, founder of postcolonial studies, and renowned
scholar, established the concept of Orientalism. His groundbreaking work on the subject
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describes the West's ineradicable, disdainful depiction and portrayal of the socially constructed,
inferior East. There is a continuous theme of ‘us versus them’ in which the superior West
colonized the East in order to help the backward region make progress. Said’s concept of
Orientalism was limited to the West’s view of the East. Later scholars, such as Emma Teng, have
showcased how the Orientalist attitude was not necessarily an East-West binary as Said’s work
exemplifies. Teng cites the Qing’s Orientalist attitude toward the Taiwanese population it
conquered, both of which are in the Eastern hemisphere. This attitude is evident through the
implementation of various methods of racialization including “changing mainland perspectives
on the capacity of the natives/savages… to a sense that [they] needed to be ‘transformed’ and
later conquered”.77 Thus, scholars, such as Emma Teng and other historians associated with the
new Qing scholarship, have demonstrated the limits of Said’s East-West binary by documenting
how the Orientalist frame of mind informed Qing colonial expansion in Xinjiang, as well as
other regions of the empire including Taiwan, Tibet, and Korea.
Throughout the reign of the Qing, the Chinese center regarded Jiayu Pass, one of the
westernmost passes through the Great Wall, as the border between the Chinese center and its
borderlands. This “boundary [became] infused with cultural meaning”.78 With this mentality,
Qing leaders and intellectuals viewed anything beyond this marking point as “a wild geographic
domain… but also land of exotic culture; it separated two different ethnic groups of different
cultures”.79 This notion became widely accepted and viewed as a geographical, religious, and
ethnic border between the civilized and uncivilized, or the inner and outer, regions of the empire.
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In his book, Orientalism, Said quotes a passage attributed to Evelyn Baring, Lord
Cromer, a British colonial administrator, containing the Latin term in statu pupillari. The literal
translation is as follows: “In the state of pupilage; meaning subject to the rules of a college or
university as they apply to junior members”.80 In the context of the passages’ arguments, Lord
Cromer uses this to highlight his view that the people in question are bound to be lower on the
hierarchical scale due to the notion that Western knowledge and experience always comes out on
top. Lord Cromer always thought of the Egyptians as human material he could govern because
they were the exact opposite of the European mindset. As Said bluntly summarizes, “the crime
was that the Oriental was an Oriental”.81 This specific mindset of Orientalism is evident in the
Qing’s sense of cultural, political, and social superiority over Xinjiang and its inhabitants.
Throughout the Qing’s reign of Xinjiang, the dynasty did not view the region, nor the people, as
equals, but rather cultivated a hierarchical differentiation between them and the region of
Xinjiang, isolating the region from China proper.
Elliot Sperling’s article: “Awe and Submission: A Tibetan Aristocrat at the Court of
Qianlong”, supports the theory of Orientalism within this Eastern context because it shows how
one dominant power, the Qing empire, created and perpetuated a specific negative view of the
people it conquered. Sperling shows that even the dynasty employed Orientalist tactics through
its colonial rule by the ways in which it described and mocked the dress and language of other
ethnicities. Likewise, L.J. Newby’s article highlights the large number of writings that focus on
the cultural differences between the Han Chinese and Uyghur population. What contrasted the
most with Han society was “the gown worn by both sexes… the men sporting beards and
close-shaven heads, and the young girls with their long hair braided in five or more plaits”.82 The
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description given was not to just describe their attire, but further build a barrier as “the gowns
[were] described in terms of atomized alien features”.83 No matter the source of the writings, the
Qing control consistently attempted to prey on the people of Xinjiang and show their society as
going against the norms of the empire.
Another common source of writings were the exiles, some of whom were intellectuals as
well, who were living in the region and detailed their experiences. Newby’s article describes
many such accounts. The exile’s works point out Xinjiang’s geographical beauty and natural
features such as oases, deserts, and mountains. However, Newby addresses how the exiles’ travel
writings “ensured an abnormally high degree of coherence in the images conveyed back to the
center and contributed to a static view of the society and culture of the region”.84 The
homogenous view produced from these writings contributes to the statist narrative because
Xinjiang’s frontier was perpetually discriminated against through Orientalist depictions of
geography and culture. The narrative describing Xinjiang “as an unalienable part of China”85 was
produced for Han viewing and helped achieve the Qing’s goal of legitimizing its power over the
frontier region.
Throughout the Qing’s reign from the 1750s until the early 20th century, Qing officials
did not view Xinjiang as an equal playing partner. Notably, official’s views of the region only got
more hostile toward the end of the Qing era.86 As the disdainful views progressed, the instilled
hierarchy became more apparent. This act of othering the frontier region, its people, culture, and
geography, contributes to the Qing’s reign as a watershed moment in Xinjiang’s history and
legitimizes these viewpoints for centuries to come.
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Conclusion
Prior to the Qing conquest, foreign rule within the region was often short-lived and
shifted among a variety of powers. Upon their colonial conquest of Xinjiang for security reasons,
the Qing vastly expanded its empire and implemented various imperial military and
administrative institutions. Lastly, the empire’s mass migration policies to the frontier region of
Han Chinese and other ethnic groups solidified its drastic control of the region, including the flux
of demographics. The examination of Qing history, historiography, and its colonization of
Xinjiang allows one to see why the dynasty’s rule throughout its conquest can be seen as a
watershed moment in the region’s history. These efforts have not gone unnoticed, as they paved
the way for the Chinese government’s rule of Xinjiang starting in the 20th century.
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Chapter II: From Empire to Modern State: Reception and
Transformation of the Qing Colonial Legacy (1949 to 2021)
Introduction
The legacy of the Qing empire has been ingrained into Chinese society, in terms of
tangible impacts as well as within the hearts and minds of the Chinese government. Regardless,
the Qing empire laid the foundation to the region for the eras of Chinese rule that followed. The
aim of this chapter is to situate contemporary Chinese state policies toward Xinjiang within a
historical framework that bridges the imperial and modern eras to identify continuities and
discontinuities with the Qing legacy of colonialism. The most advantageous way to explore the
parallels between these two periods is to examine the present day relations between the Uyghurs
of Xinjiang and the Chinese government of the PRC.87 Many historical trends have been
institutionalized within the region since the start of the 16th century. From the Qing era to
present day, history has often been found to repeat itself, manifesting a real life Groundhog Day
scenario.88 Administrative and civilizing projects, forced migration, an attempt to maintain vast
territorial acquisitions, and the concern over local and global events all remain influential to the
PRC today despite the Qing’s original implementation of these practices four centuries ago.
These accepted Qing practices have had lasting impacts one can still see taking shape in the form
of modern Chinese policy. In lieu of all of these, there are still a plethora of notable differences
as well. The Chinese state is able to penetrate further and deeper down than before since it is
now ruled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Similarly, the PRC now maintains that
Xinjiang has always been an integral part of the PRC in order to benefit their position as a
87
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rapidly growing powerhouse in the modern world. Despite labelling some changes as blatant
differences, the modern Chinese state would be nowhere near where they are today, especially in
terms of colonizing practices in Xinjiang, if it was not for the foundation laid out by the Qing
empire. This chapter will demonstrate that the PRC has perpetuated the civilizing mentality of
Qing colonial rule while departing from its predecessor given modern technological advances
and political norms.
Continuities from the Qing
As seen in Chapter I, administrative and civilizing projects constituted the crux of Qing
colonial activities in Xinjiang. Using migration to shift demographics and change ethnic ratios,
while also maintaining and expanding territory, set the Qing apart from other previous dynasties.
As one of the most strategic dynasties, the Qing passed on this roadmap of territorial expansion
to its modern day counterparts. Forced migration, vast territorial acquisition and maintenance,
and the consideration of international factors are the three prime areas of focus modern day
Chinese policy looks back toward the Qing to adopt.
Administrative and Civilizing Projects: Forced Migration
During the early years of the Qing’s rule in Xinjiang, it is reported that there were only a
few hundred Han people living in the region.89 Despite the degrees of imprecision in regards to
the Han population estimate and the unknown Uyghur percentage in Xinjiang during this time,
detailed censuses and personnel narratives agree that the Qing forcefully ordered the settlement
of thousands of Han to the Xinjiang region throughout the remaining years of the 19th century.90
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As we have seen through settler colonialism, the Han in Xinjiang increased exponentially to 30%
of the total population in the late 19th century in comparison to 60% being Uyghurs.91
The ethnic ratio in Xinjiang stayed fairly stable until there was a steep decline of Han
over the early 1900s which lasted until the middle of the century, unsurprisingly overlapping
with the Warlord Era
(1916 to 1928) of
Chinese history.92
One potential cause
for this drastic
decline of Han in the
Xinjiang region was
the consistent revolts, uprisings, and rebellions brought about by the wave of independence
movements sparked by Uyghur Turkic pride in 1933 and 1944. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s
there were numerous attacks perpetuated by Uyghurs in an attempt to showcase their disapproval
with Chinese policies in the region.93 Groups of rebels assaulted small towns and massacred the
Han population. These violent acts most likely discouraged migration to the region, gave the Han
a valid reason to feel threatened by their surroundings, and flee in fear of being persecuted.
However, once these rebellions were relatively quelled by the Chinese state, this is where
one starts to see the parallels between the Qing settlement plan and modern day migration
patterns in the PRC. Since the founding of the PRC in 1949, the migration patterns in the region
demonstrate the central government’s goal of resettling Han Chinese into the region. There is a
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clear, very sharp upward trend of Han settlement between 1953 and 1982. During this time, the
Han population nearly went up by 18 times.94
After 1982, the ethnic population ratio and composition minimally fluctuated throughout
the years. However, a possible explanation for the slight increase in the Uyghur population in
comparison to Han over the 21st century could be attributed to Han Chinese parents being
allowed one child less than ethnic minority families in Xinjiang until August of 2017. This
policy has since changed to no longer allow ethnic minorities to have more children than Han in
order to maintain what the Chinese government calls ‘ethnic equality’.95
Regardless of the minute shifts over the decades, the Chinese government’s intensified
promotion of Han migration and reclamation of land is justified by their need for stability and
economic self-sufficiency of Xinjiang.96 Given this parallel, it is evident that Xi Jinping, the
current President of the PRC, has modeled the modern era migration patterns after the Qing
empire’s efforts due to the similar ratio to the Qing-era demographics we now see in modern
times. Professor Stanley W. Toops completed extensive research on the intersection between
ethnicity and population in Xinjiang and also suggests that Xinjiang’s demographic situation
today is similar to that of the early Qing period.97 The settlement initiative of the Qing dynasty
sparked modern day application given its relative perceived success by the Chinese central
government.
Not only does the modern day ethnnic population ratios reflect that of the Qing era, but
the civilizing mentality of the center has remained consistent as well. The Chinese government
started to promote and encourage Han migration to the Xinjiang region in order to quell the
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possibility of another resurgence of extremism as seen in the 1940s. Similarly, the Chinese center
aspires to bring millions of Han from the metropolitan to peripheral Xinjiang.98 The Chinese
government is doing this for the exact same reasons the Qing did: to eliminate the cultural,
religious, and historical practices of the Uyghurs while strengthening the ties between Xinjiang
and the center. Refocusing Xinjiang toward the Chinese center is done in order to diminish the
region’s relations with nations west of the PRC, mainly central Asia where Muslim influence is
plentiful.
The legacy of the Qing is still apparent in the 21st century CCP given the long-standing
civilizing mentality. This mentality is exemplified by the mass migration policies to the region
today. However, this is not the only similarity to the Qing era. The Chinese government today,
still utilizing the civilizing framework, is equally wedded to maintaining the geographical
borders the Qing empire colonized centuries ago.
Administrative and Civilizing Projects: Territorial Acquisition and Maintenance
As Chapter I elucidated, the Qing strategically decided to conquer Xinjiang for its use as
a national security buffer. As with their Qing predecessors, the Chinese government continues to
perpetuate this view. By upholding its commitment to territorial acquisition and maintenance
within the region, the PRC isolated and differentiated Xinjiang from other provinces and
territorial claims of the mainland.
Within a modern context, the Chinese government’s desire and power to maintain vast
territory is something that cannot go unnoticed. Over 200 years ago, the Qing’s forceful
establishment of Xinjiang as one unified geographic nation rather than the two distinct northern
and southern regions paved the way for PRC intrusion and administrative control of the
expansive territory it now calls one of its autonomous provinces. The Qing during its reign
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expanded and attempted to administratively control Xinjiang, Taiwan, Tibet, Central Asia and
Mongolia with notable success. This expansionist mindset of the Qing resonates with the
Chinese government today. It now claims land and has ongoing territorial disputes with
seventeen different countries over land and sea regions.99 One of the more notable contemporary
disputes in which the Chinese government plays its hand in is the dispute over the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Starting in the 1970s, the major point of contention is whether these
islands are part of Okinawa or part of Taiwan (which the Chinese government also claims).
Strategically, the mainland wants these minor islands for territorial influences, sea lane control,
and access to economic resources in the area.100 Despite the CCP’s multifocal strategy in the 21st
century, Xinjiang is still an imperative part of the mainland’s expansionist tendencies as it has
been since the Qing dynasty.
The statist mindset toward Xinjiang has remained relatively consistent since the late
imperial era. Mao Zedong summarized the viewpoint of the dichotomy between the center and
peripheral nations when he said the PRC “is a country vast in territory, rich in resources and
large in populations; as a matter of fact it is the Han nationality whose population is large and the
minority nationalities whose territory is vast and whose resources are rich”.101 This exploitative
and hierarchical relationship is the one constant throughout Han-ethnic minority relations. It is
evident that the core exploits the foreign peripheral regions to take advantage of the economic
resources and administratively make decisions in order to reverse, or eliminate all together, their
perceived backward culture. These nation-building activities are where the “rich resources lying
untapped ‘wait’ for the spiritual impulse of the ‘Chinese nation’ for their exploitation”. 102 Today,
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the central government invests substantially in Xinjiang’s urban and transport infrastructure.103
Similarly, the state now uses a form of internal colonialism to use the ethnic minorities in
Xinjiang as laborers in Chinese factories for economic benefit.104 The administrative and
civilizing projects informing Qing territorial expansion and maintenance have been adopted by
the current communist regime but have been tailored to suit its economic and political goals.
Policy Shaped by Domestic and International Concerns
The PRC today is not only known for its growing domestic and international influence,
but persistent strategic maneuvers that make the economic powerhouse a global order threat. In
order to accomplish this, Chinese policy today is impacted by both local and international
concerns, as it was during the Qing empire. The logic of conquering Xinjiang to be used as a
security buffer has continued into the communist era given the range of local and global impacts
the CCP takes into consideration. By understanding the global initiative, one can see the way the
Chinese government parallels the logic and strategy of the Qing empire in regards to taking not
only domestic, but international, concerns into consideration as another continuity.
One of the major global impacts that has paved the way for Chinese policy to be
influenced by international concerns is the United State’s War on Terror stemming from
post-9/11. The infamous War on Terror introduced by former President George Bush in the early
2000s provided the Chinese government an opportunity to adopt and legitimize the global War
on Terror and use this rhetoric as their defense and rationalization for the government’s actions in
Xinjiang. Early on in the 21st century, the Chinese central government solicited the United States
and other Westernized nations to add a group of Uyghur militants in Afghanistan to the list of
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designated terrorist cells.105 Once successfully completed, this action set a precedent for viewing
the Uyghurs based on a global terror framework and justified the crackdown on their religion and
cultural norms.106 Sean Roberts argues that the root cause of this modern day issue stems from
the War on Terror and “the international obsession with combatting a vaguely defined ‘terrorist’
enemy that has allowed the Chinese government to implement these measures with impunity and
that, at least in part, has inspired their excessively brutal and genocidal nature.”107 This broad,
sweeping narrative output by the United States for an international audience increased in
aggression over time and was able to be adapted by the Chinese government despite the varying
contexts.
In the spring of 1998, the National People’s Congress of the PRC included “stirring
antiethnic sentiment”108 as a possible punishable offense as a crime against the state. This
potentially allows for the persecution of minorities given that any activity could now be
considered a crime against the state with this new classification. Due to this, any unrest within
the region can be labeled as terrorism and put to rest under the grounds of the CCP’s own War on
Terror. Given this broad label, the Chinese government can now perpetuate a cultural genocide
within their own frame of mind.
However, if the Chinese state wanted to legitimately handle the growing Uyghur
grievances, Beijing would need to address them directly and not through a proxy War on Terror.
The Chinese government is fueling their own perceived terrorist threat. As discussed, the local
policies of forcing Han migrants to the region and the blatant crackdown on Uyghur culture
through educational, economic, or religious reforms pave the way for Uyghurs to feel threatened
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by the state as if their own survival is on the line.109 As the Qing forced the Uyghurs to the
periphery, the Chinese government is impinging on Uyghur freedoms through shifts in policy
that are supposed to engender greater unification. Instead, the Uyghurs feel as if they are targeted
and marginalized. Currently, the Uyghurs are fighting for the allocation of fair economic
programs and being able to openly practice their religion and culture without fear of being
persecuted. Deescalating this situation will not likely happen anytime soon unless the leaders of
the Chinese government take a step back from the global influences of the War on Terror rhetoric
and listen to the real demands of the Uyghurs.
Another factor contributing to the central government’s attempts to tighten their control
over the region is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This CCP project seeks to connect Asia
with Africa and Europe through land and sea networks in order to increase pan-region
integration, trade, economic prosperity, the understanding of other civilizations, and world peace
for all involved. This lofty goal has been in the works for almost a decade now and already has
an estimated $575
billion invested in
it.110 As the map
displays,111 Xinjiang
is in a critical
position regionally
for the success of
BRI accessing new
109
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infrastructure across the world. In addition to the national security concerns discussed earlier in
this thesis, the BRI, which seeks to link the PRC with the global community, has also contributed
to the regional crackdown on Xinjiang by the Chinese government. Starting with the Silk Road,
Xinjiang has long been a cross-border region, now holding the position of the bridge between the
PRC and the rest of the world. The current Chinese government is attempting to expand
Xinjiang’s historical position as an important trading center for economic, political, and social
gains, at the expense of the Uyghur population.
Four of the six BRI corridors, including the controversial China Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC), all run through southern Xinjiang.112 Kashgar, an oasis city in Southern
Xinjiang, is planned as being the hub for all of these connecting corridors. The Chinese
government views this location as a very strategic point for social connections and invested a
lump sum of money in the region, even going so far as to designate it as an Economic
Development Zone.113 These zones are areas with economic and business policies that differ
from the rest of the country in order to attract foreign direct investment and boost domestic
growth. In 2017 alone, the Chinese government invested around $66 billion dollars into the
infrastructure of Xinjiang.114 Despite this, economic growth was not seen as even amongst the
minorities living in the region. This investment is set to benefit those who are already benefiting:
the Han. Rather than shrinking the gap, this initiative has made it worse, not soothing the
Uyghurs’ grievances with the state. Furthering the tensions from the unequal investment, the
Uyghurs see Kashgar as the “spiritual heart”115 of their culture, religion, and history. The Chinese
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government interference is seen as a threat to Uyghur culture and identity, only adding to the list
of inner-Xinjiang conflict.
The Chinese government worries that the increasing globalized network brought forth by
the BRI will encourage Uyghurs to connect more with the Middle East and Central Asia. 116 In the
government’s mind, this would allow the Muslim population to develop a greater sense of
connectivity with other predominant Muslim regions and be more exposed to their ideology,
increasing the violence toward the Chinese state. However, those same Middle Eastern states are
not supporting the Muslims in Xinjiang. The BRI assists in the oppression of the Uyghurs
because the Middle East will benefit from the billions of dollars the PRC is investing in this
project.117 Given this world climate, Muslim-majority countries in the region have been silent on
the oppression in Xinjiang. In July 2019, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab
Emirates, Algeria and other Muslim-majority states assisted in blocking a Western led coalition
at the United Nations, calling for the PRC to allow independent, international observers into
Xinjiang to judge the activity going on there.118 This failure to act has limited the imperative
support the Uyghurs need from Muslim communities and other countries across the world.
The PRC has learned to play the international cards to their advantage, signaling the
continuation of considering domestic and international factors. Similar to the Qing, the CCP is
also adopting administrative strategies to alter demographics and maintain territory. However,
given our advanced, globalized, modern society, the Chinese government has needed to adapt to
the mounting pressures. Contemporary leaders of the Chinese government are now adopting
advanced systems of surveillance to accomplish what the Qing did more than a century ago.
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Discontinuities from the Qing Empire
Despite the similarities, the differences between the Qing and the current Chinese state
attest to the modern times and the adaptability of the core, the CCP, to fully exploit its periphery,
Xinjiang. The state in the modern era keeps penetrating deeper down given that it is now a
communist state with the ability to do so. It has become clear throughout the 20th and 21st
century that the traditional empires used different strategies to keep their power in comparison to
the ruler of a developed nation state. The Chinese government argues that their increasingly
colonizing and discriminatory practices are strategic and imperative to keep order within the
borders. The penetration into Xinjiang society via civilizing and colonizing projects, including
increased surveillance and societal discrimination within the education and employment sectors,
in tandem with maintaining that the region has always been an imperative part of the PRC, are
two overarching differences between the modern Chinese state and Qing dynasty.
The Making of a Surveillance State
Genocidal atrocities are not new to the world. The Holocaust, in addition to the Rwandan,
Cambodian, and Rohingya genocide, stained the past century. Now, the civilizing and colonizing
projects of the modern Chinese state travel down a dangerous path toward all out genocide.
Surveillance in the Xinjiang region is a distinguished example of the Chinese government’s
civilizing and colonizing projects that attempt to not only control, but erase, Uyghur culture,
religion, and history. The most important features of Islam in Xinjiang, including mosques,
religious education, and religious observance, are being attacked by the Chinese state and
governmental policies.
The Uyghur population is essentially living in a “virtual cage”,119 as surveillance systems
continue to monitor their voices, actions, and life outcomes. Streets throughout Xinjiang are
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bombarded with dozens of security cameras planted on every city block. Regardless of the fact
that the PRC is ranked as having the most surveillance in the world, Xinjiang is
disproportionately targeted.120 Security
cameras of this era have reached a new
level.121 The state uses the information
collected on the cameras to match faces to
DNA and voice samples. 122 Additionally,
citizens must install a police
app that tracks their
movements, vehicles, and ID
cards.123 You must always have
your ID card on you in order to
pass the security checks in the
major cities or when crossing the region.124 Furthermore, the invasive app is part of a larger
software system called the Integrated Joint Operations Platform.125 This software accumulates
large amounts of personnel data on Xinjiang citizens from a range of sources and then uses
artificial intelligence to cross-list and identify individuals whom the Chinese government deems
suspicious.126 The application’s success became apparent when the China Cables, a collection of
120
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secret Chinese government documents discussing the persecution of the Uyghurs, were leaked.
More specifically, this unnamed police app provides the government access to the Uyghur
population’s personal information, political views, use of birth control, and electricity use at their
private homes.127 Not only are there virtual eyes, but real-life police presence patrolling the
streets and checking phones constantly. This makes obtaining a modern day Uyghur perspective
fairly difficult as they live in fear, knowing they are always being watched. Often, what they tell
domestic or foreign reporters is a memorized script or long monologue, officially making the
Uyghurs a part of the CCP’s propaganda.128
Looking at the quantitative data, there was a 92.8% increase in domestic security
spending in Xinjiang, increasing to 57.95 billion RMB ($8,845,842,654) in 2017 from 30.05
billion RMB ($4,640,000,000) in 2016.129 The surveillance and collection of data through
state-installed software contributed to the rising level of arrests in Xinjiang between 2016 and
2017 because of the perceived threats and suspicions from personal data. In 2016, there were
27,404 arrests in Xinjiang and then, one year later, 227,882 arrests were made.130 In 2017,
Xinjiang accounted for 21% of the PRC’s total arrests despite Xinjiang having 1.5% of the
PRC’s total population.131 These numbers not only demonstrate the CCP’s modern ability to
secure control over Xinjiang through deeper penetration, but also not include or count those
located in the Vocational Education and Training Centers. 132
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Internment Camps
It is estimated that one million Uyghurs, out of the eleven million in Xinjiang, are
currently detained in Chinese internment camps and are no longer members of society.133 These
internment camps were
recently built, as there is less
than a three year gap
between the top and bottom
photo, the latter being taken
in 2019.134 The quick
construction demonstrates
the vast uptick in Chinese
hard policy and oppressive
tactics targeting the Muslim
Uyghurs. These internment
camps, from first hand
accounts, are not for
educational purposes, but
rather used as torture camps in which one woman reports that, “for the first time in [her] life…
wished [she] was dead”.135 These internment camps permit violent torture, food deprivation,
forced labor, and sterilization.136 Other personal accounts corroborate these suspicions with their
descriptions of how CCP guards beat up Uyghur men using electric batons, make the ‘prisoners’
133
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take turns sleeping or standing because the rooms are too crowded, and some women would
bleed for months on end due to the treatment they were receiving from the Chinese internment
guards.137
The centers were implemented by the Chinese government, citing them as a method to
combat the religious extremism seen in the terrorist attacks carried out by the Uyghurs. The
Chinese government's crackdown on the Uyghur population is considered a counterterrorism and
deradicalization mission in which the goal is to reduce ethnic unrest and domestic instability.
These policies are used to clamp down on elements believed to be fostering dissent, advocating
independence, or carrying out terrorist strikes.138 The Chinese government states that these
centers:
“offer systematic education and training in response to a set of urgent
needs: to curb frequent terrorist incidents, to eradicate the breeding ground for
religious extremism, to help trainees acquire a better education and vocational
skills, find employment, and increase their incomes, and most of all, to safeguard
social stability and long-term peace in Xinjiang”.139
These centers are considered beneficial for individuals predisposed to extremist ideology to steer
them down a path toward reentering society as a changed individual. Vadim Pisarevich, deputy
permanent representative of Belarus to the UN Office at Geneva, said he was impressed by “all
[of the] modern facilities and skillful teachers that [help] students acquire new knowledge and
professional skills.”140 He further argues that these centers are meant as places of rehabilitation
rather than places to be held as a prisoner.141 Despite accusations of poor conditions and brutal
oppression as the Western media suggests, internal Chinese documents state the conditions are
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often “better than the living standards that some students have back home”.142 From the statist
perspective, the Vocational Education and Training Centers provided by the government allow
the Uyghurs, who are currently a threat to security and stability, to have a second chance at life.
Children’s Education
Despite the direct human rights violations in the previous cases, the CCP’s educational
policies and strategies in Xinjiang, starting with the Mao period in 1949, further control and
foster a sense of national identity through a variety of reforms and control mechanisms. The
strategies the CCP implemented revolve around education in order to “integrate all ethnic groups
into a single and unified socialist state”143 from a bottom-up approach, starting with the youth of
Xinjiang.
The state’s sponsored educational policies subdue the culture, religious, and historical
traditions of the Uyghur population. Elementary schools only have state sponsored curriculum.
The CCP’s bilingual education policy appears on the surface to be the best of both worlds.
However, “a key component of this effort is to eliminate literary, academic, and professional use
of the [Uyghur] language”.144 Mandarin Chinese as the primary language throughout the
education system “is a precision attack, a cruise missile, if you will, against the [Uyghur]
culture”.145 The use of Mandarin has become so dominant that the younger Uyghur generations
speak better Mandarin than they do Uyghur.146 Now that religious classes are illegal, educational
policies through “the younger generation is the final frontier in China's war against Uyghur
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identity”.147 Children in Xinjiang will therefore pass down their Mandarin-dominated education
and lack of Uyghur cultural awareness that the Chinese government has purposefully instilled in
society.
It is important to note the success the Chinese government found in mandating
compulsory primary education for all.148 However, there was noticeably slower success in the
mandation for minority dominated areas. Similarly, growing gaps between the Han and
minorities across Xinjiang is exemplified in aggregate data from six local Xinjiang high
schools.149 As kids get older and move beyond elementary school, the rates of retainment are
actually very low for both the Han and minority populations. Only 132,907 Han students were
enrolled in middle school within the six examined districts in addition to the 181,530 minority
students.150 On the surface, it
appears that educational
access is equally granted
given that there are more minority students in both middle and high school. However, when
examining the total population of these districts and considering the ratio, Han children, on
average, are 1.54 times more likely to attend middle or high school than their minority
counterparts living in the same districts. Despite the data being from 1991, these trends have not
only continued into the modern era, but have gotten perpetually worse. This leaves the Muslim
minority population in Xinjiang with a reason to believe the CCP has ulterior motives given the
suspicious validity and success of policy masked as education reform. This outcome is not what
the Chinese government had originally hoped for. Rather than the goal of further integration
147
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between the core and the periphery, the Uyghurs and other ethnic minority groups in the PRC
recognize the shrinking ethnic autonomy within the education sector, and resist the statist agenda
that has been put into place.
Employment and Forced Labor
Education is not the only societal institution seeing further state control, employment
opportunities are dwindling for the Uyghur population given that they are systematically
disadvantaged with mounting prejudices against them.151 Given this combination, the Han
majority perceives the Uyghurs as being uneducated and backwards due to their culture and
practice of Islam.152 This allows Han employers to justify why they don’t hire more of the
Uyghur population despite the fact that the state implemented educational system is a direct
cause for minorities’ lack of higher education. Posted job requirements for civil servant posts,
state-owned enterprises, and private-sector jobs are often reserved positions exclusively for Han
Chinese, even when posted on government websites.153 For example, announcements in 2011 for
teaching positions at a middle school in the Hoten district, a locality where 96.3 percent of the
population is Uyghur and 3.5 percent Han, advertised all twenty positions for Han only.154
On the surface it appears as if this discrimination should be a similarity to the Qing era.
However, the difference in this case is that the instilled hierarchy has transformed itself into a
plethora of societal institutions given the deeper penetration rather than just being in the hearts
and minds of the controlling power. This prejudiced social structure has now manifested itself in
state-forced factory labor. Ironically, these statist discriminatory actions are what brought the
Uyghur population to the forefront of international media. State sponsored Uyghur labor
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benefited hundreds of name brand companies across the world. End Uyghur Forced Labor is a
coalition of civil society organisations and trade unions whose goal is to end the state’s human
rights abuses specifically targeting the Uyghur population. They call for all companies to remove
themselves from Xinjiang within every level of the supply chain. Despite Xinjiang being around
15% of the PRC’s total territory, 85% of PRC cotton production comes from the Uyghur
region.155 This labor contributes to the $15 billion dollar cotton industry profiting the PRC, none
of which the Uyghurs ever see themselves as benefiting from this profit or from the external
investment, enhanced domestic spending, or development programs that the central government
initiated.156 As previously noted with the impact of educational policies, employment and forced
labor practices within Xinjiang have further fueled the fire between the Uyghurs and the Chinese
state as well.
Religious Discriminations and Limitations
The final realm in which the Chinese state targets the
Uyghurs directly is for their religion and its common
practices. In the same leaked statist Chinese documents of
classified government information, the China Cables, it is
detailed how “freedom is only possible when this ‘virus’ in
[the Uyghur and other Muslim minorties’] thinking is
eradicated and they are in good health.”157 The virus is not a
legitimate health concern, but rather a characterization that
the religious practice of Islam is a disease. In a separate
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leaked speech given by President Xi Jinping to state chosen Xinjiang officials in April of 2014,
he stated that “the psychological impact of extremist religious thought on people must never be
underestimated. People who are captured by religious extremism… have their consciences
destroyed, lose their humanity, and murder without blinking an eye”.158 Regardless of whether
one agrees with President Xi Jinping’s statement on the characteristics associated with religious
extremism, it is still evident the President’s ultimate goal is to repress the practice of Islam in
Xinjiang despite the majority of Uyghurs in the region moderately practicing the religion and not
being considered religious extremists.
In order to be able to target religious practices, the Chinese government categorizes
illegal religious activities as criminal offenses defined by:
“criminal offences defined as any religious activities and activities in the
name of religion that contravene national laws, regulations, policies at the state
level, and the religious laws, regulations, rules at the level of autonomous regions,
according to Opinions on Defining Illegal Religion jointly issued by the United
Front Department of the Party Committee of East Turkestan Uyghur Autonomous
Region [Xinjiang], State Administration for Religious Affairs, and the Ministry of
Public Security in 2011”.159
Former U.S. House Representative Dana Rohrabacher argued in a hearing that this definition
contributes to the classification of Uyghurs as extremists given “that can mean anything outside
of the tightly controlled, narrow space for Chinese Government state approved religious activity,
including… holding an unauthorized religious class for children”.160 This legal positioning
allows activities, similar to the one described by Representative Rohrabacher, to be classified as
extremist and build up that repertoire using Chinese propaganda despite their relative benign
nature.
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Even before the actual religious practice takes place, the classification of Uyghurs
already places them in a discriminatory state. All of the Five Pillars of Islam are limited in some
form by the Chinese government under their laws despite being traditional, normative practices
of Islam. The Five Pillars of Islam include: the declaration of faith, daily prayers, fasting during
the month of Ramadan, alms, and the pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in a lifetime. Uyghurs
are limited in their participation from each of the pillars given they are forbidden from engaging
in the five daily prayers (unless over the age of sixty-five); Uyghurs under eighteen are
prohibited from entering a mosque; Civil servants, students, and teachers are prevented from
fasting as well as restaurants being forced to stay open in an attempt to fully ban fasting; and
private Hajj trips are banned.161 In order to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, one must go through
an education process and be accompanied by state officials.162 Similarly, “hyping up religious
fanaticism through growing beards or choosing names in an abnormal way”163 is a part of
governmental legislation in Xinjiang since March of 2017. These actions are vindicated given the
fact that some Uyghur practices fall under the illegal religious activities law in the PRC. Given
this, the Chinese government “will always keep up the intensity of its crackdown on ethnic
separatist forces and deal them devastating blows without showing any mercy”164 as stated by
Xinjiang Party Secretary Wang Lequan in January 2003. The root of the problem is the religious
discrimantion occurring on a legal level that manifests as specific targeting of Uyghur Muslims.
In addition to discriminatory religious classification, another method to eliminate Uyghur
culture and religion is through the destruction of religious sites. Bellingcat, an investigative
journalism website, and the Guardian used satellite imagery to confirm the partial or full
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destruction of two dozen Islamic religious sites in
Xinjiang since 2016. Three examples are
depicted on the right.165 These are culturally and
religiously important buildings that contribute to
the Chinese government’s systemic oppression.
The official policy of the Chinese state is
targeting the Uyghurs and other minorities in
Xinjiang for their religious and cultural
background, rather than for being terrorists. It is
evident that “there is a significant price to pay…
for thinking outside of ‘the nation’ and
‘modernity’”.166 The Uyghurs let go of the
familiar and normative narrative produced by the
statist entity and now face repercussions from the state for writing their own history.
The Chinese government refutes its activities constitute targeted oppression, but rather
the removal of these mosques is done for economic benefits for Xinjiang. Despite this argument,
there is evidence otherwise. The Chinese government destroyed mosques, mazars, and Uyghur
historical holy places that bring history, community resources, healing, or the promise of
fertility.167 Their destruction is not for economic land value because the land the religious sites lie
on is left desert and barren post destruction.168 Furthermore, mazars, one of the only things left
that “[maintain] a community tie to history and the land”169 are often desecrated “by denuding
165
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[them] of [their] external display of community veneration”170 but not demolished, rendering the
land completely useless for no economic benefit.171
Thum also takes the stance that the structures which remain physically intact have
become museumified destinations
for Han Chinese tourists.172 Denton
elaborates and details how “in the
postsocialist consumerist society…
ethnic cultures have become
commodities in the tourism
economy, and their display and
performance feed and fuel Han
romantic desires to experience the cultures of exotic ‘others’”.173 These highly inauthentic tourist
attractions attempt to monopolize on cultural differences in order to make a profit on Han
tourism while ignoring the distinct ethnic cultures. A false sense of tourism has been established
in Xinjiang where Uyghur culture is recreationalized so that the multiethnic nation is further
imaginized inaccurately. Likewise, this tourism strategy allows the Chinese government to
showcase its tokenist support for Islam while also limiting Islamnic relgious practices Uyghurs
partake in.174 Discrimination policies and deliberate acts of destruction exemplify why the
Chinese government seeks to suppress the Uyghur Islamic culture and religious practice. These
acts and policies are done to erode away at religious practices that root Uyghurs in the identity,
culture, and practice of Islam.
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Statist Uyghur Classification
Something many fail to realize is how the PRC built the social construction of the term
Uyghur, along with many aspects of Uyghur identity, in the modern era. Despite the umbrella
term, the Uyghurs are a fairly diverse population. While the population has unified political
minority status in the PRC, there is diversity amongst its classification. The formation of the
commonly known Uyghur identity stems from a statist narrative rather than legitimate Uyghur
history. The reshaping of the Altishahri Turki identity was done in order to form what is now
known as the Uyghur nation.175 Thum’s article gives insight on the nature of an identity system
that came before the nationalist Chinese state. Before the 1930s, there was a contrast between the
understanding of what constituted Uyghur identity in comparison to Altishahris. Upon
discovering this buried narrative, one can see the definitive contrast between the identity
promoted by the PRC’s multinational state ideology rather than the authentic history of the
identity politics within Xinjiang.176 Due to the inherent nature that there is not one, unified
Uyghur voice, it is crucial to represent a plethora of their viewpoints. By not essentializing their
voice, one is able to engage with their voices, ultimately mapping their diversity within this
unified struggle of resistance.177
The state also alters the narrative to falsely accuse the Uyghur population of terrorist
attacks in order to oppress them based on their religious, ethnic, and cultural differences. Three
specific incidents are pointed out by the state as justification for their reading of the Uyghurs and
other Muslim minority groups in the country as terrorists: The 2009 Riots, Kunming Station
Attacks, and the 2013 Tiananmen Square Attack. 178
175

Thum, Rian. "Beyond Resistance and Nationalism: Local History and the Case of Afaq Khoja.”
Ibid.
177
See Chapter III for more detail.
178
Gracie, Carrie. “The Knife Attack that Changed Kunming.”; Kaiman, Jonathan. “Islamist Group Claims
Responsibility for Attack on China's Tiananmen Square.”; Wong, Edward. “Riots in Western China Amid Ethnic
Tension.”
176

51

In July of 2009, in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, riots broke out in the streets when the
Chinese police force confronted ethnic separatists and Muslim extremists who were advocating
for the Chinese government to investigate a brawl between Han and Uyghur workers that
occurred earlier in the week. Xinhua News Agency, the official state-run press agency of the
PRC, argued that the Uyghur population in Xinjiang committed “premeditated and organized”179
crime against the state. The Chinese government blames the Uyghurs for instigating the
reoccurring unrest in the Xinjiang region over erroneous claims of governmental oppression.
Four years later, in 2013, a terrorist suicide attack carried out and claimed by the
Turkistan Islamic Party left two tourists dead and thirty-eight others injured. This Islamic
extremist organization was founded by Uyghur jihadists and is classified as a terrorist
organization by the Chinese state’s official policy.180 The Chinese government announced that a
Uyghur family drove their car into Tiananmen Square with an attempt to kill innocent civilians in
Beijing.
Lastly, in 2014, “a terrorist attack carried out by Xinjiang separatist forces”181 occurred at
Kunming Station, the main railway system serving the southern Chinese city. At least ten
attackers carrying knives stormed the station, killing five and wounding over one hundred
others.182 Often called ‘China’s 9/11’, this premeditated terrorist attack was the final straw for
Chinese authorities, citing that the Uyghurs’ perpetuation of ethnic conflict must be stopped.183
The Chinese government believes the Uyghurs are to blame for this terrorist activity and
need to be reeducated in order to preserve the harmonious Chinese multiethnic state. President
Xi Jinping urged security officials to “severely punish in accordance with the law the violent
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terrorists”.184 The President also wants the international community to "understand the serious
and complex nature of combating terrorism”185 and how it is necessary to “go all out to maintain
social stability”186 in the Chinese state.
However, data from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses
to Terrorism’s Global Terrorism Database (START), suggests that the majority of the Uyghur
terrorist attacks actually occurred in the
mid to late-1990s rather than in the 21st
century as the staist narrative argues.187
However, the peak for other terrorist
attacks in Xinjiang comes just before
2015.188 This allows the Chinese state to
prescribe historical events onto modern
times without recognizing the different
contexts or perpetrators.
Since 2017, there have been no
Uyghur Separatist Terrorist Attacks
according to START. In fact, since 1990,
very few acts of civil unrest,
assassinations, and bombings in the PRC can be definitely traced back to Uyghur separatists
groups.189 This data illustrates that Uyghurs are not the dominant forces in Xinjiang perpetuating
184
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terrorist attacks in recent years.190 Therefore, it is evident that nowhere else in the world is a
whole ethnic population systemically punished and assumed responsible by their own nation
state for terrorist activity they have recently not committed nor condoned.
Xinjiang’s Role in Relation to the PRC
As the Chinese state further penetrated Xinjiang’s society, it also now maintains that the
region has always been an integral part of the PRC in order to benefit themselves in the modern
world and maintain that the nation is still a harmonious, unified multiethnic state. This is yet
another contrast from the Qing empire. Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, it was apparent
that Xinjiang and its people were subordinate in the socially constructed hierarchy via
discriminatory practices of the Qing.
As explored in Chapter I, there was an attempt to other the people of Xinjiang throughout
the reign of the dynasty and depict the minorities’ society as going against the norms of the
dominant majority. The main way of doing so was through Orientalist tactics within their
colonial rule by the ways in which they described and mocked the cultural differences, language,
and social norms of other ethnicities. The Qing promoted a different kind of coexistence than the
CCP in part due to their own status and desire to be classified as a conquest dynasty. Currently,
the multiethnic Chinese state does not pursue this tactic given their goal of showing the
international community their progress, modernization, and acceptance of a variety of cultures.
Whether these actions are a form of tokenism is up for debate.
Interestingly enough, the Chinese government now claims the Xinjiang region has always
been an integral part of the Chinese state, even during the Qing era, and is on an equal playing
field with the core of the PRC rather than as a periphery region. The State Council Information
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Office of the PRC believes that the early dynasties consistently “integrated with neighboring
clans, tribes, and tribal alliances”191 despite the Qing’s notable history of forceful conquest and
colonization of the Xinjiang region. Similarly, the convenient message put out is that “many
ethnic groups worked together to develop [the PRC’s] vast territories and build the diverse
Chinese nation”192 in order to paint an untroubled, rather than tumultuous, history. Given this
rhetoric, the Chinese government attempts to establish the importance of Xinjiang in a historical
context in order to find success in creating a narrative that portrays Xinjiang as a welcomed
region in the PRC’s multiethnic state, despite the blatant tokenism.
The modern CCP differs from the Qing through their attempt to promote the idea of a
unified, multiethnic nation rather than it being a facade as in the Qing era. The PRC is home to
fifty-six different ethinc groups, fifty-five of them being in the minority.193 The Han population
makes up 92% of the entire Chinese population, leaving the fifty-five minority groups to make
up the remaining 8% of the population.194 Given the disproportionate distribution of population,
Chinese law seeks to achieve ethnic unity and limit the discontent between ethnic groups. Since
the formation of the PRC in 1949, article 50 in the Common Program of the Chinese National
Political Consultative Conference states:
All nationalities within the boundaries of the People’s Republic of China
are equal. They shall establish unity and mutual aid among themselves, and shall
oppose imperialism and their own public enemies, so that the People’s Republic
of China will become a big fraternal and co-operative family composed of all its
nationalities. Greater Nationalism and chauvinism shall be opposed. Acts
involving discrimination, oppression and splitting of the unity of the various
nationalities shall be prohibited.195
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From the start of the modern era, Chinese development has focused on the promotion of ethnic
unity and growing together as one unit rather than fragmenting. The Chinese Constitution and
the laws within it stipulate that all ethnic minorities are equal not only to each other, but in
regards to the Han population.196 This government sanctioned document includes the protection
of ethnic rights and interests as well.197
With this framework and ideology came its implementation through policy practice. This
top-down approach of inter-ethnic unity is exemplified through the Chinese government’s
establishment of four delegation branches starting in the summer of 1950.198 These government
representatives visited regions where ethnic minorities were the majority, or close to, including
Xinjiang.199 Their purpose was to establish a mutually beneficial relationship through research,
economic aid, trade, cultural exchanges, health care, and labeling these regions as Autonomous
regions for the benefit of the ethnic minority.200 The strategic top-down approach to taking action
in the unification of the multiethnic state strengthened the relations between the center and
periphery and institutionalized the norm of creating economic or social programs in various
regions to ensure inequality and segregation diminished overtime and into the 21st century.
Despite Chinese law written in a way to unite ethnicities across the PRC, many view the
government’s actions as insecure attempts, disguised propaganda, and the Hanification of
Xinjiang. There is reoccurring evidence that Xinjiang and its people are important to the PRC for
exploitation rather than a mutually beneficial relationship between a core and periphery or ethnic
196
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diversity. In 1999, the Chinese government instituted a project called the Great Leap West in
which Xinjiang’s infrastructure was revamped and economic investments were spent in the
region by the central government. Beijing claims that these economic initiatives have benefited
the region as a whole, which is factually accurate.201 However, what is left out of the dialogue is
the fact that “the more homogeneous regions are also those more likely to enjoy said benefits”202,
contributing to the Uyghur belief that the economic benefits are not equally gained across the
region of Xinjiang. Overall, The Great Leap West is not as innocent as the Chinese government
makes it out to be and further perpetuates the pre-existing economic inequalities. These
cleavages are what cause a majority of the issues today. The CCP created a system in which the
Uyghurs are disproportionately disadvantaged despite the economic investments as a
lackadaisical cover up. These cleavages are occurring in the social sector as well, including
regulations within education and limitations based on the dominant norms of the practice of
Islam. New policies being introduced are simplified by the Chinese government as a way “to
promote national unity”203 in Xinjiang. Similarly, the state is putting out White Papers that state
“Chinese culture… has always been the emotional attachment and spiritual home for all ethnic
groups in Xinjiang”.204 It is evident that the core is attempting to argue Chinese culture and the
sinicization of others is what keeps the country bonded, rather than the celebration of the many
ethnicities in the PRC. If anyone is to then question the PRC’s policies, which Western nations
often do, they are then quickly labeled by the Chinese government as neo-colonialists.205
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Conclusion
The legacy of the Qing conquest of Xinjiang is a watershed moment in which the Chinese
government perpetuates that colonial legacy with modifications based on technological advances
and the shift in political norms. Due to this extremely consequential period of time, the PRC
strategically chose to maintain some similarities, including being wedded to maintain the
geographical borders of the Qing empire while also upholding the civilizing mentality and
forcing migration. Although there are structural similarities, the PRC used modern day
modifications and played to their strengths, differentiating from some policies of the Qing by
adapting to advancements in society. These modern adaptations of the communist state for
further penetration, technological use of surveillance, and internment camps for the Uyghur
population set the 21st century PRC apart from the Qing era. The CCP’s modern ability to seize
control over political, economic, and social decisions with greater ease and implementation in
Xinjiang has also allowed for the core to dominate the narrative surrounding the unbalanced
relationship with the periphery. The dominant theme seen throughout the different statist rule is
that the civilizing themes and missions remained constant, no matter the time period.
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Chapter III: Domestic and International
Responses to Chinese State Policies
Introduction
In contrast to the dominant statist perspective, Chapter III calls attention to the domestic
and international reactions to the civilizing and colonizing projects of the modern Chinese
state.206 PRC policies targeting the Uyghurs are galvanizing oppositional groups within their own
borders and communities, but also across the globe in the United States, despite the Western
country’s unintentional role of fueling the fire with their War on Terror rhetoric. The range of
diverse viewpoints characterize the variety of responses to Chinese state policies in the region of
Xinjiang. To account for this diversity, this chapter will identify and analyze a variety of
contemporary voices within the domestic Uyghur community, but also activists and politicians in
the United States, who have sought to redress this population’s struggles. Regardless of the
geographical location, these voices collectively contest the claims of the Chinese central
government discussed in the previous chapter.
Story of Contested History
Chapter III maps the alternative accounts of Chinese governmental policies and their
impact on Xinjiang to elucidate the larger context of this contested historical narrative in which
numerous voices have emerged to exemplify the escalating tensions. Until recently, the dominant
account accessible to an international audience has been that of the Chinese state rather than the
Uyghurs. A broader understanding of the Uyghur struggle became more audible toward the end
of 2019 when social media activists and other news outlets started to report on the plentiful, yet
206
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often unrecognized, human rights violations. An understanding and examination of the PRC’s
historically constructed roots reveal flashpoints of contention regarding Xinjiang rather than the
controversial PRC point of view. This realm of history is one of the hottest zones of contention
because there are two dominant competing narratives: the CCP, a diverse Uyghur population, and
those supporting the latter. Generally, the history produced by these two groups is incompatible
because they are motivated by polar opposite purposes, narratives, and sources. However, both
sides hope that their story becomes adopted as the authentic regional history. While Uyghurs use
their version of history to resist Chinese rule, the CCP uses their version to justify its political
and military control over Xinjiang and vindicate their internment of the Uyghur population.207
This contested history is best exemplified by a famous woman that appears in both
Chinese and Uyghur historical narratives. Known to the Chinese as the Fragrant Concubine and
to the Uyghurs as Iparxan, the disparate readings of this historical figure exemplify key areas of
contestation between these two groups. Iparxan was a young Muslim woman who ended up in
the imperial Qianlong court.208 These facts are the only consistencies between the Han and
Uyghur versions of the story. The Han depiction of Iparxan’s story is fairly romanticized and
filled with Oriental tropes. As they tell it, Iparxan was sought after by the Qianlong emperor for
her beauty and exotic features, living a luxurious life as the emperor attempted to fill her every
desire. In contrast to the Chinese who wrote Iparxan as a powerful symbol of unity, the Uyghurs
have written her as a symbol of resistance in modern times. Uyghurs insist that Iparxan never
wanted to be taken to the palace of Qianlong as she found his lust for her undesirable. As such,
207
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she carried tiny daggers in the sleeves of her robes to enact revenge for her involuntary
capture.209 Reaffirming the Uyghur narrative, Millward argues that Iparxan’s story can be seen as
a Chinese parallel to Western Orientalism, in which sexual tropes often confirm colonialist
power.210 He uses Han writers’ interpretations of Iparxan to prove their willingness to depict the
unfamiliar Uyghur population as exotic.211
Millward exemplifies the different ways in which she has come to symbolize the
conflicting aspirations of the Chinese and the Uyghurs. The varying representations of this story
have had modern day impacts due to its popularity. Millward argues that the Uyghur voices
emphasizing their side of the narrative can be interpreted as emphasizing Uyghur resistance to
the Qing and succeeding Chinese states.212 The story of Iparxan can then be seen as a metaphor
for the ethnic and separatist protests in Xinjiang today which complicates the local history of
Xinjiang as the facts of the story remain contested.
As Millward does in his analysis of the contested story, the following discussion is
multifaceted in order to incorporate the plethora of voices also supporting the Uyghur
population. Two broad focus categories are: domestic and international responses. The former
will be further broken down into Uyghur voices who are still located within the PRC today.
These include three intellectual perspectives and selected local stories from Xinjiang. The latter
include a wide range of international organizations and individuals who use their expertise in
history or politics to advocate and inform America and other western nations on the true
dichotomy between the state and the Uyghurs inside Xinjiang.
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Domestic Responses
The domestic responses within the PRC are plentiful. However, such voices are often
oppressed. The local Uyghur population is not only silenced, but largely silenced and educated
by the PRC on what to say to international visitors and media, most of whom are followed by
local authorities. These local voices are rarely authentic but have become puppets for a forced
Chinese state narrative. Xinjiang locals have become “members of the propaganda
department”213 because they fear being taken to the camps more than being controlled by the
state. Not only are the indigneous populations silenced, but those who come to speak on their
behalf are as well. Journalists have been followed by unmarked cars at high speed, forced to
leave towns, or not served at restaurants under CCP policy.214 This oppression leaves little room
for domestic voices to emerge, but those who have authority and power are the ones willing and
able enough to showcase Uyghur history and the local narrative, despite risking their lives to
promote their ideology and cause. In the 21st century, even the champions of Uyghur rights are
now being forcefully silenced across the region.
Intellectuals
The champions of Uyghur rights, who are predominantly intellectual advocates, live in
the PRC and abroad. An exploration of Uyghur intellectuals is imperative because they are
primarily targeted for their knowledge of Uyghur history, ethnic past, and their ability to produce
and disseminate narratives on topics the Chinese government is attempting to permanently erase.
These happenstances contribute to the broad Uyghur perspective that this minority group is being
assaulted for their religion and culture given their implementation and tools of passive resistance.
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Since April of 2017, the Chinese government has interned, imprisoned, or disappeared at least
338 intellectuals.215
Ilham Tohti
One prominent intellectual who has been detained on separatism charges since 2014 is
Ilham Tohti, a Uyghur economics professor at Minzu University, a prestigious university in
Beijing. He is a fierce and proud advocate for Uyghur rights and embedded these viewpoints in
lectures at his place of work.216 Tohti’s aspiration was to further Uyghur freedom of expression.
The use of his role as an educator to address the destruction of Uyghur culture and religion in
many interviews and publications eventually led him to be flagged as a separatist under Chinese
law.217 One of the projects the Chinese government cited as having seperatist tendencies was
Tohti’s creation of ‘Uyghur Online’. This website, solely in Chinese, allowed a dialogue to exist
between Han and Uyghurs in a way the 21st century could adapt to due to its online format.218 He
used this platform as a vehicle for change in order for Han to have an opportunity to read about
Uyghur sentiment in a forum-based dialogue rather than violently on the streets.219
Similarly viewed by the Chinese government as problematic, Tohti also wrote:
“Present-Day Ethnic Problems in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region: Overview and
Recommendations” in response to a 2011 request from high-level officials in the Chinese
government.220 In it, Tohti examines, critiques, and makes suggestions on different areas of
social, political, economic and religious life in Xinjiang. By analyzing the root causes of present
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day ethnic tensions, Tohti discusses, as does this thesis, why unemployment, forced bilingual
education, and religious persecution generate the current Uyghur-Chinese state ethinc tensions.
It is evident through Tohti’s projects and personal narrative that he attempted to fill the
gap in the history of Uyghur society for the Han Chinese population in an attempt to reduce
ethnic-based tensions. His goal was for all citizens to better understand the diversity of a
multi-ethnic society, something Tohti argues is imperative for the PRC to function smoothly.221
Despite the picture the Chinese government painted of him, Tohti’s work is grounded in
surprisingly moderate ideology in which he emphasizes the importance of dialogue and
respectful reconciliation. Unlike individuals who the CCP would easily identify as extremists,
Tohti’s goal was to “[implement] regional ethnic autonomy while also safeguarding national
unity”.222 The concept that there would be any connection between Xinjiang and the PRC is
fairly moderate considering there are citizens of Xinjiang who do not consider themselves part of
Chinese society at all to display a sense of unity for their own culture and history.
Tohti’s willingness to work with the CCP stems from his moderate, yet effective,
ideology. Using his impressive education and economic expertise, Tohti attempted to benefit the
Chinese government monetarily while also improving Uyghur relations. He advised that “simply
pouring money from central government coffers into Xinjiang to create a slew of make-work
jobs [was] not the right approach…. [it would] prove an undue fiscal burden for the
government”.223 As previously stated in Chapter II, the CCP’s financial planning of Xinjiang was
fueling greater tensions between the Uyghurs and government. Tohti’s publications and speeches
often proposed mutually beneficial options instead of a one-sided argument and arrangement. He
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also suggested that “by taking an active role in organizing and guiding population shifts within
Xinjiang, the government can alleviate unemployment in the south, while also reducing ethnic
segregation.”224 Working with all parties involved to “[seek] equilibrium between national unity
and regional ethnic autonomy in Xinjiang”225 would increase the sense of unity for all. Tohti’s
aspirations were not about splitting the nation up further, or fostering hostile relations, but
emphasizing the willingness and need to strengthen the ties between Xinjiang and the Chinese
core in order for the PRC to succeed.
This approach to finding a balance and communication was not only seen throughout his
published works, but in his website: ‘Uyghur Online’.226 The goal of this media page was to
establish a gateway of regular communication between the Han and Uyghur populations in an
attempt to lessen the ethnic tension across the PRC. Tohti even acknowledged in his own
personal writings that after creating and being inspired by the website, he also increased his
“effort to interact with Han intellectuals in order to bring Xinjiang issues to their attention, thus
allowing them to contribute their valuable perspectives and experiences to the discussion, and to
introduce them to [Uyghur] culture and society.”227 Tohti believed that silence and
non-acceptance would contribute to the social, political, and cultural tensions already boiling
over in the region. These methods were employed to increase that communication and lessen the
distrust between the Han, the CCP, and the Uyghur population. Tohti’s tolerant, reasonable, and
patient approach within his published and online works not only placed him in a position to
appeal to the masses and not just the intellectual community, but granted him leeway with the
government for many years. Furthermore, this allowed Tohti to have the time to advance his
224
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main goal of championing Uyghur rights across the globe. Unfortunately, this relationship did
not last forever. Eventually the Chinese government classified his actions as speratist in nature.
Tohti was arrested in 2014 for assisting in the creation and publishing the Uyghur based
content website. He was charged with separatism, for which he could be imprisoned for life
according to Article 103 and 105 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China.228 Give
that he was found guilty and sentenced to life in prison, the Chinese government believed that
Tohti was “among those who organize, plot or carry out the scheme of subverting the State
power or overthrowing the socialist system”229 instead of his true intention of promoting justice.
However, what is most concerning is that “whoever commits any of the crimes of endangering
national security, … if the crime causes particularly grave harm to the State and the people or if
the circumstances are especially serious, may be sentenced to death”.230 This precedent is
incredibly dangerous to free speech within the PRC’s borders.
Despite these harsh rulings, the constitution within the PRC articulates that Chinese
citizens, which ironically also constitutes Uyghurs, under Article 35 and 41 of the PRC
Constitution, are guaranteed freedom of speech and the right to criticize their government.231
Therefore, even if Tohti’s actions were perceived as critical of the socialist state, that is legal
under the Chinese Constitution. However, since the Chinese government does not really think of
the Uyghur population as real citizens that need to be silenced, the rules are prescribed to them
more harshly and with greater force.
Furthermore, as one of the five permanent members on the United Nations Security
Council, one would expect the PRC to follow the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. That
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is not the case, as the PRC is in violation of Article 19 which grants everyone “the right to
freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and
regardless of frontiers”.232 As the years go on, it is starting to become evident, as exemplified by
Tohti’s case, that the Chinese government is willing to sacrifice human rights in order to protect
and advance their Communinst State in order to become a great power within the international
sphere.
Rahile Dawut
Ilham Tohti is not the only individual to be blocked by Xinjiang officials in regards to
freedom of speech. Another Uyghur intellectual, Rahile Dawut, disappeared in 2017 under the
same pretenses as Tohti. Dawut was a professor at Xinjiang University and worked as a folklorist
and ethnographer.233 She created and directed the University’s Minorities Folklore Research
Center and is a well known author of dozens of articles and a number of books within her
repertoire.234 Dawut’s work mainly centered around intellectual pieces given her background in
local folklore. Her impressive research on Uyghur-Chinese ethnography was funded by the
Chinese government before her disappearance.235 However, her image has drastically changed,
where she is now commonly called two-faced, a blanket category used by Xinjiang state officials
to describe “intellectuals who have lost their old role as mediators between the Communist Party
and the community”.236 Originally, the Chinese government viewed Dawut as someone who
could be a liaison between the ethnic community of Uyghurs and the state but now see her as
someone who still has their loyalties to their respective ethnic minority.
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In the CCP’s eyes, Dawut’s intellectual work exemplifies the reasoning behind their
uncalled-for crackdown. Her work fills in and allows the international community to understand
the missing narrative on the historical and cultural significance behind Uyghur religious customs.
Dawut greatly contributed to the discussion and understanding of the mazars, the Uyghur
historical and holy places, as discussed in Chapter II. Her published work “Mazar Festivals of
the Uyghurs: Music, Islam and the Chinese State” is now purview to the international academic
community. Despite the overarching notion that mazar festivals simply focus on prayer and
personal grief, Dawut has drawn attention to the “redrawing of the line between ‘illegal religious
activities’ and the folk customs’ of the Uyghur”. 237 Shifting position in CCP policy has become
less lenient and more hard-lined, including the persecution of mazars. In this case, Dawut’s
understanding allows for the dissemination of the authentic meaning behind a traditional Ugyhur
custom. Contributing to her persecution, Dawut’s voice disadvantages the Chinese government’s
cultural and religious crackdown on the mazars based on erroneous claims of political threat
while also going against CCP propaganda.
Another scholarly article published by Dawut educates the reader on the Uyghur
Meshrep. This is a traditional male gathering that normally includes poetry, dance, and music but
also possesses unique characteristics depending on the social groups’ age. 238 Dawut argues that
knowledge of this specific element of Uyghur culture is a beneficial aspect of understanding the
unique Uyghur culture in its entirety.239 This area of Uyghur Islamic expertise is where Dawut
specializes, bringing to light specific elements of traditional Uyghur belief systems within the
context of the 21st century. She examines areas of Uyghur culture and social life, specifically
complex religious activities, sites, and the pilgrimage to the shrine that are under-researched as a
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way to fill the gap of knowledge.240 By suggesting that these practices associated with the mazars
are passed down from generation to generation exemplify her commitment to keeping tradition
alive. This advocacy and promotion of local Uyghur history through the lens as an ethnographic
researcher increased local stories in the field of academia on an international level, but also
placed her in a dangerous position for government persecution.
These horrific stories belong to just two of the 338 intellectuals who have disappeared
over the years. Artists, poets, musicians, and media professionals are also targeted for their
professional knowledge and promotion of Uyghur culture within the context of their societal
institution.241 While intellectuals are part of the Uyghur population, this elite group is a
privileged class and their collective experience is not representative of the vast majority. This, in
tandem with the Chinese state being the puppeteer of the common Uyghur population, leaves
very few authentic stories from Xinjiang. There is little to no access to the local Uyghur
understandings given that the state has instilled a hush-hush policy to control the locals and keep
events under the radar. In fact, the Chinese government has kept the internment camps “so secret
that people from the community don’t even know what’s in there… People know there is such a
place, but no one [knows] where”.242 Therefore, not only is the local population silenced, but
they are not informed on the whereabouts of their neighbors, friends, or families.
International Responses
Despite the state sanctioned silence, one of the biggest barriers of entry hindering the
local population is that they do not have direct support from the international community within
the region’s border. However, this international support has been on the rise, especially within
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the United States, throughout the 21st century based on involvement from the political and
historical sectors. Given the issues with local reporting from Xinjiang, more and more are relying
on international individuals, scholars, and organizations with legitimate resources to accurately
investigate and detail what is happening within Xinjiang and the internment camps. For years
now, there has been a growing international concern and focus on the CCP’s reported abuses of
their own ethnic population.
Expat Uyghur Organizations
On a macro level, there are two Uyghur-based international organizations that must be
included within this discussion: Uyghur Human Rights Project and World Uyghur Congress.
Both of these groups have found their own niche within the pool of international organizations.
Uyghur Human Rights Project specifically promotes the rights of Uyghurs and other Turkic
Muslim peoples in Xinjiang. This organization has an ethnic focus on the Uyghurs, but also a
geographical focus on Xinjiang. Their research based advocacy from intellectuals worldwide
allows them to report in English and Chinese on defending the Uyghurs’ civil, political, social,
cultural, and economic rights within the Xinjiang borders. Their research is completed in order to
produce reports that will benefit the Uyghur population directly. Similarly, the World Uyghur
Congress also promotes a variety of Uyghur rights through peaceful and non-violent methods.
This group is slightly more political than the Uyghur Human Rights Project, as they work
directly with the United States Congress and European member states to enact change. Their
work is tailored to governmental bodies in an attempt to create legal or political change that can
then be specifically applied to the conflict in Xinjiang or directly target the PRC for their harmful
actions against their own citizens. The former President of World Uyghur Congress, Erkin
Alptekin, argued that “the Chinese want to replace us with their own people as colonists, and
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assimilate those of us who remain, wiping out our culture”.243 This standpoint is rooted in
scholarly historical work in which the former President attempts to use his platform to take back
what the Uyghurs have wrongfully lost via exploitation.
Regardless of the similarities and differences in their methods, both of these
organizations are heavily funded by grants from the United States government. The National
Endowment for Democracy is one of the leading private nonprofit funds dedicated to growing
and strengthening a variety of deomcratic institutions across the globe. More than 1,600 grants
are given each year for organizations to achieve democratic goals in more than ninety countries
around the globe.244 National Endowment for Democracy funding largely comes from the United
States government. In 2013, the House Appropriations Committee provided $122 million while
the Senate Appropriations Committee provided $236 million.245 At the end of the 2020, The
House of Representatives approved funding for the National Endowment for Democracy to be
raised to $300 million, this increment is proportionally similar to the Senate as well.246
This funding has become extremely important for both the Uyghur Human Rights Project
and World Uyghur Congress. These organizations thrive off of this funding that is indirectly
coming from the United States government. In 2019, the Uyghur Human Rights Project was
awarded a $315,000 grant, for a total of $1,239,698 between 2016 and 2019.247 World Uyghur
Congress is now becoming another prominent human rights organization to raise awareness
about the Uyghur conflict and bring awareness to it on a global scale. This rise in popularity
matches their increase in funding over the years. On the other hand, World Uyghur Congress was
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allotted $246,000 in 2017. Then, just one year later, saw a significant increase when they
obtained $354,000. Funding for other projects earned the organization an additional $380,000 as
well.248 With this increased funding, World Uyghur Congress can now work toward leadership
and advocacy training seminars for Uyghur youth and the advocacy for Uyghur issues at the
United Nations and the European Parliament.
Another international organization that attempts to use their position of power to mitigate
tensions in the Xinjiang region is Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch investigates
human rights abuses or violations and exposes facts in order to place pressure on those who have
the power to instigate change. In one report published in 2018, Human Rights Watch describes
the mass abuses the official policy of the Chinese state allows and promotes within their borders:
mass arbitrary detention, torture, and mistreatment of Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang.249 This report
details the systemic and increasingly pervasive controls on daily life. Despite being a highly
reputable international organization, Human Rights Watch is concerned with hundreds of other
human rights abuses around the world, losing its tailored focus on the Uyghur struggle. There
have only been eight articles written on the Uyghur struggle on the Human Rights Watch website
since October 1, 2020.250 This is not to diminish the impeccable work the Human Rights Watch
organization does for the globe, but demonstrate how the Uyghur struggle might get lost in the
midst of other violations and how imperative the Uyghur-specific international organizations are.
Human Rights Watch is often macro-focused when it comes to Uyghur rights and what is
occurring in the borders of the PRC, one being: “The Chinese government stands out for the
reach and influence of its anti-rights efforts.”251 This broad statement could be found on any
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other news platform. The choice to bring in the Human Rights Watch into the conversation was
not to showcase their lack of effort, but recognize and understand why Uyghur Human Rights
Project and World Uyghur Congress are imperative to positive progress.
Rebiya Kadeer
There are many individuals who live in the United States having grown up in Xinjiang
fighting for Uyghur rights through a variety of education or political methods. The historical and
political approaches these individuals take are two of the most prominent and advantageous ways
for the international community to produce tangible results in terms of bringing awareness to the
ethnic genocide occurring in Xinjiang and directly make an impact on the local Uyghur
community.
Another former President of the World Uyghur Congress, Rebiya Kadeer, is one of many
Uyghur activists not located inside the PRC but exemplifies the Uyghur diaspora within the
United States. As an individual born in Xinjiang, she is an advocate for Uyghur rights and
self-determination. Growing up, she established her own laundry business and invested her
earnings to open up department stores, eventually becoming the PRC’s wealthiest woman by
1993.252 The Chinese government used her story as tokenism for Uyghur success and appointed
her to positions on the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and the National
People’s Congress.253 During her tenure, she used her position to speak on the poor education,
living standards, and quality of life for Uyghurs in Xinjiang.254 Due to this double-cross, the
Chinese government eventually imprisoned her for five years until she was released and fled to
the United States to continue her international advocacy.
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By moving to the United States, she now uses her position as a political dissident to detail
first hand Uyghur accounts and personal stories on a variety of media platforms. Kadeer
advocates for the United States’ grand strategy including caring for and assisting the Uyghur
population nationally and in Xinjiang. Unlike previous intellectuals, she does not take a
historical or academic approach to her speeches or writings. Regardless, this method is greatly
advantageous to her appeal because she represents the Uyghur masses through personal
accounts. By discussing how Chinnese officials “forcibly [take] Uyghur women from their
homes and [subject] them to forced abortions and forced sterilizations”,255 Kadeer injects pathos
within her presentations and interviews to invoke sympathy from communities who are able to
safely use their voice, which many Uyghurs do not have the privilege to do so. Kadeer’s
experience in prison changed her because she realized what it was like “to be a human being
without freedom”.256 After this experience, Kadeer decided to use her voice to represent those
who are oppressed. She advocates for the CCP to change their policies targeting the Uyghurs
based on her six years in prison before being exiled to the United States, where she is still
targeted despite the threats against her family in Xinjiang. Kadeer’s passion, determination, and
persistence allow her to deliver a persuasive story to an international audience on the real world
human rights violations Uyghurs are still enduring at this very moment.
James Millward
One of the greatest resources available for those living outside Xinjiang is Doctor James
Millward of Georgetown University. He is one of the most profound scholars of the subjects
concerning this thesis: The Qing empire and historical and contemporary Xinjiang. In the
modern-day realm, Millward provides an accessible counter narrative to the Chinese state. He
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works to bring to light the other side, the local vision, and perspective of the Uyghur-Chinese
state relations. Through Uyghur history, Millward has revealed the ethno-political past of the
Xinjiang region that presents a different narrative from the perspective of the Chinese state.
Despite the statist perspective, it is evident that “the C.C.P. is actively working to erase
the cultural and political diversity”257 in which the Qing established by conquering vast and
disparate regions. Millward expertly uses historical evidence and understandings to demonstrate
the current ethnic and political tensions between Xinjiang and the Chinese core. Within a modern
context, the CCP is attempting to establish a pan-Chinese identity masked by the tokenism of
ethnic variation. Millward argues that this attempt by Xi Jinping for a homogenous society via
“assimilationism also incites the very instability the C.C.P. has long hoped to avoid”.258 By using
his intellectual perspective to showcase whether the current situation in Xinjiang is reflective of
the historical past or not, Millward’s voice provides us with a comprehensive understanding of
the implications from the Qing dynasty in the 21st century.
Due to the fact that Millward contributed to the growing narrative of the Uyghur struggle,
it has become evident that history is changing “all the time because it is driven by the concerns
of the present”.259 With that framework in mind, Millward has expanded the range of what
constitutes Chinese history to include that of the Uyghurs, an ethnnic minority, as well as
incorporating borderland history and the notion of Xinjiang as a crossroads region. He examines
the political developments in the region over an extensive period of time in which there was no
unit that has the current geographic, political, or ethnic shape of the present day Xinjiang.260 By
doing so, the subject matter of the Uyghurs is now framed in a new light by Millward, who now
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is able to implement different levels of analysis and establish a dichotomy between the history of
the PRC in relation to the Xinjiang region.
Rian Thum
In addition to Millward, there has been an overwhelming response among writers of
history, Rian Thum being another individual leading the pack of international sinologists
building upon the Qing dynasty and Uyghur discussion. Combined, Thum and Millward are two
American public intellectuals who are scholars on the subject and advocate for Uyghur rights.
However, Thum focuses more on the roots of Uyghur history and argues there is more to the
picture than the modern conflict. By looking beyond the shadow of the Chinese state, Thum
uncovered the ways in which the identity of the Turkic Muslims of Altishahr, now commonly
recognized as the Uyghurs, was maintained before the construction of the Uyghur identity by the
state.261
Thum’s book, The Sacred Routes of Uyghur History, reveals the Uyghur story from
within Xinjiang, a drastic differentiation from the statist narrative. This study explores the ways
in which Altishahri identity has been maintained over time. In particular, the article examines
how the Altishahri approach to history acted as an expression and mechanism of group identity
maintenance.262 His argument focuses on one aspect of this identity system, the popular historical
tradition, suggesting that its deployment through both manuscript technology and regional shrine
pilgrimage contributed to the maintenance of Xinjiang's settled Turkic identity group before the
construction of the Uyghur identity was forced upon the community by the Chinese state.263
Given Thum and Millward’s location in the United States, they are able to promote their
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messages within a historical framework in the same way Uyghur intellectuals are, but with little
fear of consequences or persecution from the Chinese government.
Social Media
Social media has become another tool to spread the Uyghur story within the realm of
contested history. As internet platforms became more prominent throughout the 21st century,
social media has proven to be a new vehicle for change for Uyghurs within the PRC, a way for
the local and global Uyghur communities to connect, and increasing awareness for the dire
situation.
Regardless of the fact that the Uyghur population’s voices are censored by the state,
online platforms have become a way for Uyghur activism to persist within the PRC. Uyghurs
have been utilizing social media, blogs, and comment posts for indirectly voicing their
disapproval of the state. The only reason these posts are not flagged or taken down is because
there is a use of veiled language within metaphors, sarcasm, humor, and traditional Uyghur
sayings, all of which are being used as a means of “expressing subversive political
communication”.264 This form of communication does not end here. The Uyghur diaspora
internationally uses social media, especially Facebook, for daily communication and interaction
across transnational borders.265 The Uyghur identity is continuing to be constructed through
online dialogue between the diaspora and the homeland of Xinjiang.266 This is exemplified by the
sharing of common experiences, causes for concerns, and longing for their homeland across
international spheres.267
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Online communication has started to emerge as an important feature of Uyghur identity,
but also a way for the local Uyghur voice to be disseminated
all around the world. On Instagram alone, #Uyghur has over
231 thousand posts. Other trending hashtags include
#uyghurlivesmatter and #prisoncamps.268 The increase in
prominence started at the beginning of 2020 when it was
reported that common brands including, but not limited to:
Nike, Adidas, H&M, Gap, NorthFace, Apple, Amazon, and
Samsung profit off of forced Uyghur labor.269 Upon discovering this, many posts were made and
shared across social media platforms to raise awareness for the Uyghurs and their on-going
struggle and persecution by the Chinese state. This growing international resistance highlights
the lived experiences of Uyghurs in Xinjiang for a broader audience and demonstrates how social
media has a contrasting narrative to that of the Chinese government. Social media rhetoric has
led many politicians within the American political system to use their position of power to
initiate legal change advantageous for the Uyghur community in Xinjiang and abroad.
Politicians
Conngresspeople and senators are starting to pass bills and laws that condemn the
Chinese government for their ongoing abuses. Given that there is forced labor on the other side
of the supply chain, politicians have used this as a way to ban United States businesses from
using Uyghur labor and social media has condemned companies who continue to do so. The
Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, a bill in the United States Congress, attempts to mitigate
this concern. If it were to become a law, it would change American policy on Xinjiang with the
268

Image: Instagram account @freeuyghurnow.
Business & Human Rights Resource Centre. “China: 83 Major Brands Implicated in Report on Forced Labour of
Ethnic Minorities from Xinjiang Assigned to Factories Across Provinces; Includes Company Responses.”
269

78

goal of ensuring that American entities, including businesses, organizations, and governments,
are not permitting or funding forced labor among minorities in the region. This bill has led to
former President Trump signing the Human Rights Policy Act in 2020. This is a United States
federal law that requires a plethora of federal government entities to publish and publicize
reports on human rights abuses by the CCP against Uyghurs, including internment in the
re-education camps.270
Despite the success in terms of governmental practices, another way Uyghur recognition
is making its way into politics was throughout the 2020 Presidential election. Candidates,
ranging from President Biden to Bernie Sanders and Kirsten Gillibrand, made it a priority to
discuss this ongoing conflict throughout their campaign. Within three months of President Biden
being elected into office, the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, a United States annual
report on all countries receiving assistance and all United Nations member states, firmly
formalizes the labeling of the PRC’s actions as genoncide. With the United States going against
the statist narrative in a legal setting, the Western nation’s prestige and duty to uphold democracy
across the world can be seen as a rally call for other allies to follow suit.271 The growing sense of
public awareness will be imperative to penetrate all aspects of international society in order to
tackle this mounting issue holistically.
Despite it being a step in the right direction that President Trump signed the Uyghur
Human Rights Policy Act of 2020, and more than the United States did at the beginning of
Khmer Rouge rule in Cambodia, it may not be enough. Since the PRC poses a significant threat
to United States hegemony, the nation may be inclined to act quicker and carry a bigger stick.
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While lofty, the way to address the shifting global order is to implement a multilateral and
multidimensional approach that deter these atrocities.
The United States is uniquely capable of campaigning for multilateral partnerships across
the world to increase international pressure on Beijing. Economic sanctions, solely distributed by
the United States, would hurt the Western nation more than the PRC and are relatively
ineffective considering the PRC is a top exporting country. However, the Chinese government
cannot maintain its economic dominance if ties across portions of the world are severed. Ideally,
the United States would partner with Japan, South Korea, or Australia to implement economic
penalties or forge military partnerships. This unprecedented global pressure would expedite
economic hardship and successfully disrupt PRC supply chains.
Conclusion
The modern day genocide occurring in Xinjiang is a story of contested narratives, pitting
the Chinese state against the Uyghurs. Even then, one must dig deeper to get the full perspective
because the Uyghur voice, and their support, is not one unified voice, but highly diverse and
international. After reviewing the Uyghur voices and those who advocate for them, there appear
to be some trends. Uyghurs located in the PRC, no matter their status or type of advocacy, are at
risk. Those who directly voice opposition to official policy of the Chinese state, as Tohti did, and
those who don't, such as Dawut, are imprisoned just for existing as Uyghur intellectuals. Political
activism, or just being a Uyghur in a position of power, makes one vulnerable to persecution by
the Chinese government. As Uyghur voices inside the PRC are silenced, advocacy needs to come
from international sources. Millward and Thum, as Western scholars, might be too historical and
theoretical for the common population to comprehend the severity of the situation in Xinjiang.
However, paired with Kadeer, an expat in the United States, these international voices are in a
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position to use history, in tandem with personal experiences, to reach the hearts and minds of
populations across the globe.
International organizations are needed to reach new levels of awareness on a global scale.
In normal circumstances, the UN could be a potential mitigator. However, the PRC vetos all
matters detrimental to them, including what constitutes a genocide. The PRC previously used its
veto power in regards to human rights violations in Syria and Myanmar, showcasing their efforts
to neglect human rights standards. Therefore, it is imperative to look at the Uyghur Human
Rights Project and World Uyghur Congress. The gradual progression of international awareness
can be accelerated by advocacy from these organizations and other grassroots movements that
will force governments worldwide to unite and take action.
As demonstrated, an intersection of tools must be used when advocating for Uyghur
rights. While it is unfortunate and counterintuitive, those who are not a part of the Uyghur
community, nor located in the PRC, need to use their position to promote the variety of Uyghur
narratives that exist in order to have the most success in spreading awareness. Global awareness
and advocacy will be crucial moving forward to provide the Uyghurs with the justice they
deserve.
Holistically, the range of Uyghur voices characterize their resistance and response to the
statist policies blatantly targeting their cultural and religious practices. The variety of sources
used allows one to see the plurality of Uyghur voices under one umbrella goal: Free the Uyghurs
from state persecution, internment, and persistent colonial projects. The ultimate goal is to map
those diverse voices within this unified struggle of resistance to find ways to end the wrongful
internment of Muslim Uyghurs in Xinjiang and abroad.
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Conclusion
In this thesis I have illustrated the ways in which the local and global factors, spanning
hundreds of years, have weaved a way into 21st century Chinese state policies that impact the
Muslim Uyghurs in Xinjiang. I have articulated the multidimensional layers of historical factors
which the Chinese state has manipulated to its benefit, viewing this minority group as terrorists
threatening the national security of the PRC. Chapter I illuminated how the new Qing
scholarship of the modern era has played an important role in shaping and highlighting the Qing
dynasty in the context of other great European empires. The Qing need to be consistently
identified as an empire in order to make sense of their colonial and imperial conquests within
Xinjiang. The level of imperial control executed within Xinjiang was unprecedented before the
Qing conquest. I argued that the empire’s vast territorial acquisition, consolidation of power
through imperial administrative and military institutions, forced migration, and the othering of
Xinjiang peoples allows them to be classified as a watershed moment in Xinjiang history.
Chapter I paved the way for Chapter II by articulating the details of Qing rule in order to
make a fruitful comparison between that era and CCP rule since 1949 in Xinjiang. I suggested
that while there is a pattern of repetition between the modern Chinese state and the Qing empire,
there are also discontinuities that are necessary to take into account. I argued that in order to
establish patterns and or explore variations in statist policies, the best path to do so is through an
in-depth examination of the relationship between the Muslim Uyghurs of Xinjiang and the
Chinese core. The Chinese government took a part out of the Qing playbook with their
acquisition and replication of administrative and civilizing projects that include forced migration
and the maintenance of vast territorial acquisitions. Despite these, I also showed that the Chinese
government, being communist with the ability to penetrate deeper into society while having
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access to advanced technology, has needed to adapt to modern times and establish greater
mechanisms of control in order to exploit to the fullest potential the Uyghur population.
However, the Chinese government’s deeper involvement into society via colonizing projects
while maintaining that Xinjiang has always been an imperative part of the PRC are two
overarching differences between the modern Chinese state and Qing dynasty.
Given this, Chapter III shifted narratives to the domestic and international responses to
the modern statist policies. These responses have become more pronounced over the years given
the rise of globalized media. Domestic responses within Xinjiang and the PRC are far from
copious. Intellectuals and the indigenous population alike have been physically or mentally
silenced by a variety of propaganda tools implemented by the CCP. This control of the local
people limits the number of stories emerging from the region. This relative silence has paved the
way for international voices to rise to the occasion and become more pronounced. Voices within
the United States have found greater success, including international individuals, scholars, and
organizations with the legitimate resources to accurately investigate and report on the crimes
being committed with the Xinjiang region and across the PRC as a whole.
I made it apparent throughout Chapter III how imperative it is to explore this modern day
genocide in a context that exlores the history of the modern contesting narratives at play today. I
proved how this is not simply a local, modern day issue but one that has historical and global
impacts intrinsically tied to the region. The deteriorating conditions of human rights in the PRC
are concerning given that this same country is a permanent member of the United Nations
Security Council. Even if the PRC was not a permanent member, their actions would still be in
violation of international human rights laws. The strategic targeting of the Uyghur population on
an ethnic and religious basis is unethical, immoral, and has to be stopped by the international
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community before these behaviors become a new international norm. The Uyghur population is a
prime example of how there is potential for the international community to come together and
prevent future xenophobic tendencies across the world. It will take more than one nation to come
together and solve these issues moving forward. In a post-COVID world, one can only hope that
nations will be seeking out opportunities for transnational connections in order to come together
for the common good of human rights everywhere.
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